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Abstract: Achieving cooperation in natural resource management is always 
a challenge when incentives exist for an individual to maximise her short term 
benefits at the cost of a group. We study a public good social dilemma in water 
infrastructure provision on land reform farms in Namibia. In the context of the 
Namibian land reform, arbitrarily mixed groups of livestock farmers have to share 
the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure. Typically, water is mainly 
used for livestock production, and livestock numbers are subject to high fluctuations 
due to the given environmental conditions. Our paper assesses how alternative 
payment systems with differing congruence of provision and appropriation support 
the cooperation in the group given the ever-changing equilibria. In a first step, 
we conducted an exploratory overview of the social-ecological system of central 
Namibian land reform projects. The Social Ecological System (SES) Framework 
served as a guideline for this assessment (Ostrom 2009). Taking the complexity of 
the cooperation situation into account, in the second step we designed a role-play 
that is based on a social-ecological simulation model. The role-play simulates the 
real-life decision situations of land reform beneficiaries wherein equilibria are 
permanently changing. This approach helped us to not only better understand the 
cooperation challenges of Namibian land reform beneficiaries, but also supported 
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stakeholders in their decision making and institution building. Our study provides 
evidence to support that land reform beneficiaries increase their contributions as 
they own more livestock and as other group members increase their payments. 
Nevertheless, only groups with relatively homogeneous livestock endowments 
manage to agree on payment rules. Interestingly, the dominant rule is an “equal 
payment per farmer” and not a “payment per head of livestock”, though the latter 
would imply a higher congruence of provision and appropriation.
Key words: Land reform, Namibia, participatory ecological-economic modelling, 
public good, role play, savanna rangeland
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1. Introduction
Achieving cooperation in natural resource management is always a challenge 
when incentives exist for an individual to maximise her short-term benefits at 
the cost of a group. Since everybody in the group has the same rationale, the 
group can be trapped in a situation in which it misses out on potential gains. 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1994) are 
illustrations of this problem (Bardhan 1993). Observations of natural and social 
systems both demonstrate that it is possible to achieve cooperation (Ostrom 1998, 
2010; Nowak 2006). Therefore, the focus of attention has shifted towards the 
assessment of factors influencing the probability of cooperation. One such factor 
receiving attention is the congruence of appropriation and provision (Ostrom 
1998, 2010). We thus formulate the following research question:
Does the level of cooperation regarding group water-infrastructure provision 
on neighbouring Namibian land reform farms depend on the character of payment 
rules – more specifically, the congruence of appropriation and provision?
We study our research question in the context of the Namibian land reform. 
For more than 18 years, land has been redistributed to previously disadvantaged 
groups of the Namibian society using a broad range of instruments, such as group 
resettlement, subsidized loans, redistribution of government land and, in a few 
cases, expropriation. In this paper, we focus on the Farm Unit Resettlement 
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Scheme (FURS) which is based on the willing-seller willing-buyer principle. The 
Namibian state uses preferential acquisition rights to purchase suitable agricultural 
land whenever any owner of such land intends to dispose of it (RoN 1995). The 
Ministry of Lands and Resettlement divides the farms into smaller units and 
any Namibian citizen who has been socially, economically or educationally 
disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws can apply for an allotment of such 
units for resettlement (e.g. RoN 2002).
The research question is highly relevant in the FURS setting as there are 
hardly any permanent open water sources in Namibia. Farmers have to pump 
ground water for their livestock with diesel or wind pumps. A breakdown of water 
infrastructure leads to livestock losses and significant costs. If water infrastructure 
breaks down, farmers are forced to ask for water access at neighbouring farms. 
Usually fees need to be paid for such water access, and longer routes to water 
points contribute significant stress to the animals.
According to the lease agreements, the government is responsible for the 
maintenance of the infrastructure. Nevertheless, there are unclear responsibilities 
between ministries, and authorities are very slow to respond to infrastructure 
breakdowns. Therefore, it is generally more cost efficient for farmers to repair 
the infrastructure themselves than to bear the costs of waiting for government 
assistance. Farmers make no payments to the government for the maintenance.
For the self-organised infrastructure management no formal fee collection 
rules are specified. If FURS farmers form Water Point User Associations they are 
supposed to have an association bank account according to the by-laws. But in 
general the groups can decide themselves how to collect money and how to pay 
the actual maintenance expenses.
Maintaining water infrastructure is a collective challenge for FURS farmers. 
This fact is strongly shaped by the process of land redistribution. The splitting of 
larger farms, that were previously centrally managed, into smaller farm units means 
that beneficiaries do not have exclusive access to water infrastructure. The sharing 
of water infrastructure is emphasized in the lease agreement. FURS beneficiaries 
are forced to cooperate with their neighbouring farmers on a farm cluster. They 
enter the cooperation arena solely on the basis of bureaucratic decisions. They 
have no say as to whom they cooperate with, do not know their future cooperation 
partners, and, therefore, cannot rely on a history of social interaction.
Given this situation, the main water governance challenge for the farmers is the 
decision how much each of them contributes to infrastructure maintenance. There 
are two typical operational rules in the research region with regard to contributions to 
water infrastructure maintenance. Either farmers pay an equal fixed amount or they 
calculate a fee per head of livestock (Bock and Kirk 2006; Falk et al. 2009). Both 
payment systems have their advantages and disadvantages. The fixed payment per 
farmer is easy and transparent to calculate. It does not, however, reflect the unequal 
appropriation of water. Livestock is the main consumer of water in central Namibian 
farming systems and is highly unequally distributed amongst the farmers. The fee 
per head of livestock supports congruence of provision and appropriation which 
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according to Ostrom (1990) increases the likelihood of successful cooperation. This 
is most likely also the reason why this payment system is strongly promoted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Nevertheless, the livestock based system requires a regular 
adaptation of the individual payments. Livestock numbers vary considerably 
between farmers and change permanently due to multiple dynamics within the 
SES. It is not easy to assess each other’s livestock numbers on relatively large and 
densely vegetated farms. Direct or indirect monitoring of water appropriation is 
costly; therefore, a payment system which achieves congruence of provision and 
appropriation is associated with higher transaction costs.
It has to be emphasised that this paper is not intended to summarize the 
historical and political background of the Namibian land reform. We provide 
more background information in Appendix 1 and refer otherwise to more 
comprehensive assessments such as Werner (1993), Kaukungua et al. (2004), 
Werner (2004), LAC (2005), Werner and Kruger (2007), RoN (2010), Werner 
and Odendaal (2010). This paper focuses on one particular challenge of FURS 
beneficiaries namely the management of shared water infrastructure on small 
scale clusters of land reform farm units.
In our sample a cluster consists of up to six units and has a size between 750 
ha and 4.600 ha. The farmers lease the land from the government. They receive 
farm income mainly from meat production and enjoy a lifestyle which is much 
romanticised in Namibia (Falk et al. 2009). We study specifically the choice of a 
payment system to achieve water management cooperation.
In a first step towards answering our research question, we conducted an 
explorative assessment of our case based on the Social-Ecological-System (SES) 
Framework of Ostrom (2009) (see Appendix 1). The framework based assessment 
helped us deepen our general understanding of the complexity of the system. In 
the application of this approach, we benefited from ten years of interdisciplinary 
collaboration within the Biodiversity Monitoring Transect Analysis in Southern 
Africa (BIOTA) Project. The joint work of social and natural scientists contributed 
greatly to offering a more holistic answer to the research question. It was, however, 
not the objective of this research to describe the full complexity of the interactions 
of human and natural systems of FURS farms as one might expect in some schools 
of system research (see e.g. Foran et al. 2014). Our behavioural study follows the 
approach of taking into account diverse system features when interpreting causal 
relationships between asset heterogeneity, rule definition and group cooperation. 
As such, the explorative assessment forms the basis for theoretical considerations 
on the collective infrastructure provision challenge of FURS farmers.
In a next step, we introduce a rangeland ecosystem model, which was linked 
to the land users’ decisions on water infrastructure management. In this way a 
role-play design emerged based on a computer-simulation model. The role-play 
design allows us to capture resource dynamics in studying collective action. 
Janssen (2010) emphasises the need to increase the relevance of behavioural 
experimental approaches by strongly taking into account system dynamics. As 
such, we believe to supplement more standardised and often static experimental 
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research. However, adding complexity to the game also has some disadvantages. 
It becomes, as in real-life, more difficult for the players to understand all relations 
between different system variables. As a consequence, it is impossible to control 
for all interactions. The game, therefore, only produces relevant knowledge if it 
offers a sufficiently close representation of the real-life decision situation.
2. The research site
Research was conducted in the Omaheke region in east central Namibia 
(Figure 1). The vegetation is dominated by an Acacia-Terminalia tree-and-shrub 
savannah of the Central Kalahari (Mendelsohn et al. 2002). FURS land reform 
beneficiaries in our sample, farm with livestock, mainly cattle, and operate in a 
commercial farming setting. The farm unit clusters are clearly marked and fenced. 
FURS farmers are allotted individually fenced shares of the cluster. The size of 
studied individual farm units ranges between 50 and 2000 ha which is far below 
the average of commercial farm sizes in Omaheke (Olbrich 2012).
Table 1 summarizes the basic descriptive statistics of our sample. The majority 
of respondents (82%) use the farm units for more than 4 years. This means they 
have already had considerable time to develop infrastructure maintenance rules.
Figure 1: Map of Namibia and Omaheke region. Source of data: Mendelsohn et al. 2002.
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3. Theoretical considerations on water provision in the FURS 
setting
In the following section we present a summary of some theoretical considerations 
related to the challenge of water provision cooperation in Central Namibia. Our 
model aims at drawing theoretical hypotheses regarding farmers’ contributions 
and free ride incentives in the management of water infrastructure. A more detailed 
description on our theory and the connected assumptions is given in Appendix 2.
Consider a group of N farmers collectively using the same water infrastructure 
whose maintenance costs need to be covered to be functional. Each farmer i has 
to contribute an amount Ci, i∈{1, …, N} into the water fund WFt to cover the 
maintenance costs K. At the end of each period, after subtracting the maintenance 
costs K, the amount remaining in the water fund WFt-1 is transferred to the next 
period which represents the connection between two rounds. At the beginning of 
each period, the water fund WF
t
 has in total
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In real life, the maintenance costs of water pumps vary from year to year and are 
unknown to the farmers. We assume that these costs are continuous uniformly 
distributed along the interval [0, V], with V being the value of a new water 
infrastructure. In order to be operational every period, the amount in the water 
fund must cover the maintenance costs, otherwise the infrastructure breaks down. 
Therefore, the functioning probability of the water infrastructure depends on the 
probability that the amount in the water fund is higher than the maintenance costs:
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In case the infrastructure breaks down each farmer usually takes her cattle to the 
neighbouring farm where she has to pay fees per head of cattle, which we label 
here OC (opportunity costs). This alternative water source has a direct influence 
on the farmers’ incentive to participate in the maintenance of their own water 
infrastructure. From an opportunity costs perspective, each farmer would choose 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of sample (the game was played with 45 farmers, but for two of 
them not all socio-economic data could be collected).
Mean of age 55
Share of male respondents 60%
Education (at least primary school) 86%
Education (at least secondary school) 49%
Share having previous farming experience 72%
Share having commercial farming experience 26%
Average years since resettlement 9
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to use the water source which is less costly for her. From these considerations 
comes the following:
Proposition 1a: A group will contribute to the maintenance of their water 
infrastructure, if the group opportunity costs OCN are higher than the group’s 
total contributions CN.
Proposition 1b: An individual will contribute to the maintenance of their water 
infrastructure, if her opportunity costs OCi are higher than her contributions Ci.
Considering her individual opportunity costs OCi, the contribution of other farmers 
and the uncertain maintenance costs, each farmer i chooses the contribution Ci that 
minimizes her expected costs EC(Ci). On the basis of the model (see Appendix 2), 
we can draw conclusions about the theoretical reaction of one farmer to the 
payments of other farmers. In equilibrium the strategic reaction of farmer i to the 
contribution of the other farmers in her cluster is to reduce her contribution. On 
the strength of this conclusion we establish our next proposition:
Proposition 2: Farmer i’s contribution is negatively correlated with the 
contribution of other farmers in her group.
When a short-sighted strategic farmer i computes her optimal decision, neglecting 
future interaction and not holding other-regarding preferences, she takes the 
contribution of other farmers as given. Any additional payment of farmer i 
increases the survival rate of the water infrastructure which is beneficial to all 
farmers in the cluster. If farmer j raises her contribution, farmer i will strategically 
reduce her contribution to the group water fund. This behaviour conflicts with the 
inequity aversion concept of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and conditional cooperation 
of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010).
Another important aspect for the decision making is the fact that a farmer’s 
opportunity costs are determined by her number of livestock. Independent 
of fairness norms, she is willing to increase payments if her opportunity costs 
increase. She strives to avoid higher opportunity costs if the infrastructure breaks 
down; thus, she has an incentive to contribute. From this we derive the following:
Proposition 3: The larger the number of livestock of a farmer, the greater her 
contribution into the water fund.
The congruence of appropriation (livestock number) and provision (individual 
contribution) can be observed in this result (Ostrom 2010). A farmer with a large 
number of livestock will pay more than a farmer with a small number of livestock. 
However, as already mentioned, farmers can either pay an equal fixed amount 
or they can choose to calculate a fee per head of livestock. If herd endowment 
is relatively homogenous across farmers, then the individual payments will be 
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similar under both payment rules. The amounts differ, however, in groups with 
heterogeneous livestock endowments. From this we establish the following:
Proposition 4: The payment system with equal contribution per farmer i is 
stable in groups with homogeneous endowments. It is less stable in groups with 
heterogeneous endowments.
Propositions 2 and 3 predict that poorer farmers, in terms of livestock, will expect 
wealthier farmers to contribute more to the water fund. An equal payment would 
deviate from the optimal reaction, thus, from the equilibrium, when livestock 
numbers are unequal. From propositions two, three and four it follows that 
heterogeneous groups, in terms of livestock endowment, are, in equilibrium, more 
likely to choose the rule payment per head of livestock.
The explorative SES assessment made us aware that water provision 
cooperation by Namibian land reform beneficiaries has to be achieved in systems 
of high dynamic complexity. Amongst others, these are marked by permanent 
and often delayed changes, multiple feedbacks at different speeds, nonlinear 
relationships of variables, and often irreversible developments (Sterman 2001, 
2006; Barreteau et al. 2001). The systems are reflexive, acting on decision makers 
who, through their actions, affect various components of the system (Bousquet 
et al. 2002). More specifically, we learned from the explorative SES assessment 
that complex system interactions create strong dynamics of total and relative 
livestock numbers. In summary, we expect that a payment system which is 
linked to livestock numbers and achieves stronger congruence of provision and 
appropriation is more stable in maintaining group cooperation.
Acknowledging the complexity of social ecological systems initiated the 
debate on how to decide which variables should be included in particular studies. 
Catalogues of third tier SES framework variables collected from various studies 
quickly contain hundreds of variables. There is a common understanding that only 
such variables should be taken into account which are relevant for a particular 
study. The explorative SES assessment helped us to identify relevant control 
variables. Especially for the quantitative analysis another selection criteria has 
been important. We included only such variables in our analyses which show a 
considerable variance across our sample. With our study design we cannot make 
any statements about the importance of features of the SES which are identical 
across our sample. Such variables can still have a strong impact on cooperation 
patterns. Good examples are historical or political factors. We provide in the 
introduction and in Appendix 1 some context information on such variables.
4. Role-plays as approach to observe cooperation behaviour 
in complex and dynamic decision making situations
In order to answer our research question and test our theoretical propositions, we 
decided to use role-plays. Role-plays can be used to achieve multiple objectives. 
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They help us to acquire knowledge, validate models, support farmers’ decision 
making and negotiation processes, and develop institutional capacity (Barreteau 
et al. 2001; Bousquet et al. 2002).
Our role-play is based on two models. On the one hand, we followed the 
logic of the theoretical model described above. On the other hand, we used 
an ecological-economic-simulation model in order to capture the ecological 
interactions and dynamics of the system (Lohmann et al. 2014). The combination 
of both models simulates the complexity and dynamics of important parts of the 
social-ecological system in the context of water provision on Namibian FURS 
farms. The resulting role-plays created a virtual world in which farmers could 
experiment, rehearse decision making, and play in a compressed time and space 
(see also Barreteau et al. 2001; Sterman 2001, 2006). The model provided them 
with immediate feedback and allowed them to adjust decisions. Experimenting 
with the simulation model induces much lower costs and risks for the players than 
a real-life trial and error process of institutional change (Barreteau et al. 2001; 
Sterman 2006).
Compared to standard experiments, this approach has a number of obvious 
disadvantages. The internal validity is low as it is difficult to control many 
parameters. As a consequence the results are difficult to compare (Bousquet et al. 
2002). The role plays are not suitable for testing general theoretical hypothesis. 
Generating accepted scientific evidence requires controlled experiments which 
discriminate between hypotheses and produce replicable results (Sterman 2006). 
Nevertheless, the more complex the phenomenon, the more difficult it is to draw 
conclusions from standard experiments on real life decision situations.
The advantage of the simulation-model based role-plays is a higher external 
validity and a more realistic reproduction of real-life decision situations (Barreteau 
et al. 2001). The objective of the role-play games is to assess a representation of 
reality rather than to study a theoretical pre-given one (Bousquet et al. 2002).
As a starting point for developing our role-play, we used an existing vegetation 
model (Tietjen et al. 2010) and parameterised it for environmental conditions in 
the Omaheke region of Namibia. The model simulates the dynamics of natural 
resources depending on environmental conditions (climate, hydrology, ecological 
interactions) and land use impacts. For details see Lohmann et al. (2012, 2014), 
Appendix 3, and Supplementary Appendix. Resource dynamics derived from 
this model were dynamically linked to a social-economic model based on our 
theoretical model (Appendix 3). Specifically relevant for the given question here is 
the fact that the livestock numbers in the model responded to the vegetation state, 
the health of the animals as well as off-take decisions. The vegetation state, again, 
depends on external factors such as random rainfall, but also on the stocking rate. 
From a land users perspective this framework represents the highly unpredictable 
and complex dynamics of the real-life social-ecological system.
The combined ecological-economic rangeland model was then converted 
into a computer based role-play of basic farming decisions and, in particular, 
the voluntary contribution to the group’s water provision. We designed a user 
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interface that allows for the communication between a facilitator and the model. 
The interface presents an output of all state variables and allows for a subsequent 
input of the farmers’ decisions.
We communicated the initial ecological and economic model states using 
photographs and simple lists in the respondent’s mother tongue. Based on this 
illustratively communicated information, farmers made decisions regarding 
their stocking rates as well as their individual contribution to the maintenance of 
water infrastructure (i.e. the amount of money to be paid to a water fund) (see the 
interface and illustrations in the Supplementary Appendix).
The role-play starts with an individual and group account balance of zero. 
Each player is given a herd and farm size representing the respective real-life 
values from the farms as given in 2008. Animals and vegetation are in a good and 
above average state and the water infrastructure is functioning at the beginning 
of the game.
The vegetation state is changing every round of the game and is communicated 
using exemplary photographs taken from different vegetation states in the research 
region. The same approach, of showing pictures, is used for illustrating the body 
score condition of the livestock. Printout outputs in the player’s mother tongue are 
generated for every time step to present the following player-specific information:
•	 rainfall in the previous role-play period1
•	 the player’s individual number of livestock at the beginning of the role-
play period
•	 age structure of the player’s livestock herd at the beginning of the role-
play period
•	 the player’s number of livestock losses in the previous role-play period
•	 the player’s account balance at the beginning of the role-play period
•	 the player’s total farm expenses to be covered in the role-play period2
•	 the account balance of the group’s water fund at the beginning of the role-
play period.
In each round the players can make two independent decisions: 1) they can buy 
or sell livestock and 2) they can choose an amount to pay from their individual 
account into their group’s water fund. Both decisions are made simultaneously.
The role-play is set up in such a way that all players have the opportunity 
to continuously communicate face to face as this is the most efficient form of 
1
 For all players in all sessions we used the same randomly calculated sequence of precipitation.
2
 The total farm expenses contain an amount which is based on the size of the land and an amount 
which is based on the number of livestock. In order to simplify the role play the general expenses 
per ha and per head of livestock have been fixed in the game on the basis of expert knowledge and 
previous studies. The general farm expenses per head of livestock are relevant for the water manage-
ment as we subsumed under this amount also the costs for buying diesel to run the pumps. This was 
possible as there is widespread agreement that the even more consumption dependent running costs 
of the pumps are paid per head of livestock.
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communication for developing institutions (Balliet 2010) and is a realistic 
representation of the real-life situation.3 We did not restrict the time the players 
could communicate. Furthermore, the players had the opportunity to find out the 
decisions of the other players. This strategy was chosen because fellow farmers 
can in reality talk to each other and we did not intend to provide another evidence 
for the fact that communication supports cooperation.
After all players have made their decisions, new ecological and economic 
states (e.g. condition of livestock and account balance) are calculated by our 
simulation model. These new states are again the basis for decisions in the next 
round of the game. Figure 2 illustrates the role-play process.
The modelled water-infrastructure costs vary from year to year, reflecting 
randomly appearing maintenance costs. In the role-play, each group shares water 
infrastructure, which consists of one diesel and one wind driven pump. The costs 
are modelled on the basis of expert interviews with an annual average cost of 
N$ 2350 (σ=785) for the diesel driven pump and N$ 750 (σ=250) for the wind 
driven pump. Players were not informed at the beginning of the game how we 
calculated the maintenance costs. We told them, however, that there is a setup of 
two pumps and that costs are based on expert estimates of real-life costs. They 
were further told that the costs randomly vary from period to period in the game. 
Previous experiences of the players and specific differences between the farms 
may affect the decisions on the amount to be paid into the water fund especially in 
3
 There are several explanations why communication supports cooperation. Balliet (2010) mentions, 
in particular, receiving signals about other’s willingness to cooperate, group identity and the develop-
ment of shared norms.
Facilitator
Farmer
Facilitator
Model data communicated
(funds in water account,
livestock numbers, costs
in previous round)
Fill form
(decide on water contribution)
Data entry
Calculations of ecological-
economic model
Next time step
Figure 2: The cyclic process of the role plays.
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the first periods of the game. We hope to capture this noise in our data analysis by 
controlling for the highest maintenance costs in the previous rounds of the game. 
In addition, we control for farming experience and training received. Further, 
we separately analyse the second half of the role-plays when we assume they 
have learned approximately how high the maintenance costs are in our game. 
Throughout the game, farmers were not informed about the periods’ water costs 
before making their contribution; therefore, they have to make decisions under 
uncertainty.
In the case that the money available in the fund is insufficient to cover the 
maintenance costs, the infrastructure breaks down. In this case the players had 
to pay a fee of N$ 50 per head of cattle. The amount represents the opportunity 
costs in our theoretical model. It is based on interviews with farmers even though, 
in reality, there is a lot of variation. The opportunity costs were announced at the 
beginning of the game; therefore, players could calculate them for each round 
throughout the game.
We conducted the role-play sessions between January and April of 2009. 
The research team cooperated with the Emerging Commercial Farmers’ 
Support Programme (ECFSP), which provided lists of all land reform farms 
in the Omaheke Region. By the time of the research there were 196 Farm Unit 
Resettlement Schemes (FURS), and 45 of them (23%), sharing 14 farm clusters, 
were included in the study.4
 The selection of participants was not random, but 
predetermined by the accessibility of beneficiaries. It happened only once that 
a respondent declined to participate in the study. In most of the cases, if farms 
could not be included in the study, it was impossible to establish contact with the 
farmers. This means that we probably have a bias towards full-time farmers even 
though the team arranged interviews with part-time farmers outside of their farms 
in order to reduce this problem. It should be mentioned that the research area is 
relatively large (84.981 km²) and that the team drove up to 300 km every day, on 
dirt roads, to visit the farms. The small sample as well as the sample selection 
process has to be taken into account when interpreting our results.
In an attempt to simulate the real-life cooperation situation, the role-plays 
where played among groups of farmers who in fact share a water point. This also 
means that for each game the group size varied from between two and six players. 
The role-plays took between one and three hours. Participants did not receive any 
game related payments.
For the data analyses, we used the standard deviation of payments to identify 
groups agreeing to a rule. If the group’s standard deviation of water payments 
was zero in a specific period of the role-play, we concluded that the group was 
following the rule of equal payment per person. If, in a specific period, the group’s 
standard deviation of water payments when divided by livestock numbers was 
zero, we concluded that the group was following the rule of payment per head 
4
 Two observations could not be used in part of the analyses because we failed to collect the survey 
data.
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of livestock. The role-play data was analysed using regression models. We used 
a hierarchical mixed-effects regression model in STATA 12. This allowed us to 
control for variables on different scales. As such, we considered individual layer 
and group-context layer information.
5. Results of the role plays
Using simple correlation analysis reveals that 38% of our players increase their 
payments if the other group members also increase their payments.5 Thirteen per 
cent of the sample adjusted their payments to their share of the group’s livestock 
herd. The payments of another 6% of the players correlated with both the payments 
of the other players and their livestock share. This is possible if there is a relatively 
stable relation of livestock numbers amongst the group members. The payments 
of 42% of the players correlated neither with the other group members’ payments 
nor with their share of the livestock herd. We do not observe consequent free 
riding as all players contributed to the maintenance of the water infrastructure.
In 86% of the decisions the individual payments are lower than the costs for 
using the neighbours’ water source. In 92% of the decisions, the total opportunity 
costs of all group members are higher than their total contributions into the 
water fund. The sum of payments for the whole game is always higher than the 
total group opportunity costs. On the individual level there are still, however, 5 
individuals (11%) wherein their total game payments exceed their opportunity 
costs. As such, Proposition 1a and 1b are confirmed, albeit with a few surprising 
exceptions.
Analysing the role-plays’ contributions using regression models (Table 2) 
allows us to reject Proposition 2. In none of the models we observe a negative 
relation between farmer i’s contribution and the contributions of other group 
members. The Mixed-effects model, covering all game rounds, indicates that 
players increase their payments if the other group members increase theirs. This 
could be interpreted as inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) or conditional 
cooperation (Fischbacher and Gächter 2010).
Our results confirm Proposition 3. The players adjusted their payments to 
represent their livestock numbers. This indicates that farmers act on implicit 
norms of congruence of provision and appropriation. The players largely failed, 
however, to formalise these norms. The rule of payment per head of livestock, 
which guarantees the highest congruence of provision and appropriation, was 
unpopular amongst our players. Only one group switched, in the course of the 
game, from equal payment per person to payment per head of livestock. Another 
group agreed, at the beginning of the game, to the rule of payment per head of 
livestock, but in round two one player defected and the cooperation could not 
5
 Where there is a correlation between the player’s payment and the payments of the rest of the group 
in a particular experiment period (Pearson correlation calculated and considered to be correlated if 
p<0.05).
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Table 2: Regression models explaining the natural logarithm of the individual player’s payments 
for water infrastructure maintenance (*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001).
Fixed effects 
model for 
rounds 1–10
Mixed effects 
model for 
rounds 1–10
Fixed effects 
model for 
rounds 6–10
Mixed effects 
model for 
rounds 6–10
Game round 0.105**  
(0.0512)
0.0607  
(0.0410)
–0.0486  
(0.123)
–0.238**  
(0.0961)
Balance in group water 
account at beginning of round
–0.0000754**  
(0.0000334)
–0.0000475** 
(0.0000185)
–0.0000689  
(0.0000745)
–0.0000302*  
(0.0000166)
Individual livestock number 0.0253***  
(0.00802)
0.0176****  
(0.00498)
0.0450*  
(0.0238)
0.0180****  
(0.00543)
Cumulated payment of all 
other group members
0.0000554  
(0.0000502)
0.000110***  
(0.0000417)
–0.000136  
(0.000145)
–0.0000445  
(0.000104)
Balance in individual game 
account at beginning of round
0.00000455*** 
(0.00000149)
0.0000025*  
(0.00000137)
0.00000527  
(0.00000436)
0.00000238  
(0.00000149)
Was there an infrastructure 
break down in t–1
0.818**  
(0.306)
0.796**  
(0.369)
1.801***  
(0.649)
1.103***  
(0.389)
Maximum water costs in all 
previous game rounds
–0.000236***  
(0.0000826)
–0.000191**  
(0.0000797)
0.000340  
(0.000436)
0.00113**  
(0.000508)
No. of players in group 0.242  
(0.199)
0.396*  
(0.213)
Gini-coefficient of group 
livestock numbers
1.073  
(1.505)
0.869  
(1.076)
1.141  
(2.693)
1.093  
(1.643)
Groups agreed on equal 
payment
2.085***  
(0.638)
1.983****  
(0.309)
3.355*  
(1.797)
2.156****  
(0.647)
Group agreed on payment per 
livestock
2.438***  
(0.832)
1.491**  
(0.600)
1.521*  
(0.867)
Interaction term Gini-livestock 
and equal payment
1.766  
(3.436)
0.386  
(3.069)
9.060**  
(4.226)
–0.959  
(2.795)
Interaction term Gini livestock 
and payment per animal
–5.253**  
(2.024)
–3.121*  
(1.797)
4.213  
(4.695)
–4.200  
(3.082)
Age of player in years  0.0111  
(0.00750)
 0.0156  
(0.0102)
Sex of player (male=0, 
female=1)
 –0.807***  
(0.252)
 –0.892****  
(0.170)
Size of farm unit in ha  0.000543*  
(0.000292)
 0.000745***  
(0.000285)
Player has non-farm income  0.869***  
(0.311)
 0.878***  
(0.340)
Player has access to other land  –0.374*  
(0.199)
 –0.597*  
(0.342)
Education level  0.714****  
(0.155)
 0.846****  
(0.163)
Weeks of farm training 
received
 –0.00187  
(0.0135)
 0.00282  
(0.0176)
Years since farm has been 
redistributed
 0.0443  
(0.0263)
 –0.00593  
(0.0326)
Amount in N$ invested in real 
life in water infrastructure
 0.000025**** 
(0.00000717)
 0.0000283*** 
(0.00000997)
Player has valid lease 
agreement
 0.366  
(0.325)
 0.161  
(0.393)
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Fixed effects 
model for 
rounds 1–10
Mixed effects 
model for 
rounds 1–10
Fixed effects 
model for 
rounds 6–10
Mixed effects 
model for 
rounds 6–10
2008 marginal farm income 
(incl. Investments)
 0.0991****  
(0.0198)
 0.124****  
(0.0149)
Relation of working pumps to 
total pumps in real life
 1.134**  
(0.490)
 1.045**  
(0.484)
Number of ha served by one 
pump in real life
 –0.000107  
(0.000152)
 –0.000389**  
(0.000180)
Constant 4.151****  
(0.645)
–0.365  
(1.090)
2.089  
(1.647)
–2.760  
(2.239)
Observations 450 430 215 215
Table 2: (conitnued)
be re-established. Five groups agreed to the rule of equal payment per person. 
Overall, six out of 14 groups agreed to follow a clear payment rule consistently 
throughout the game. Five groups cooperated from the first round, and one group 
started to cooperate after round four.
In reference to Proposition 4, we cannot confirm that adopting the rule of 
payment per head of livestock was positively correlated with the variance in 
livestock endowment within groups. Table 3 indicates that groups with less 
variance in livestock endowments were more likely to come to an agreement on 
a payment rule. In contrast, groups with a greater variance in initial livestock 
endowments often failed to provide sufficient funds in order to avoid an 
infrastructure breakdown. Nevertheless, players who were confronted with 
situations of unequal livestock possession were more likely to adopt an implicit 
norm of congruence of provision and appropriation. In contrast, the implicit norm 
of adjusting payments to other group members’ payments was more frequently 
observed in groups that closely resembled a homogeneous livestock endowment 
(Table 3).
Our regression models (Table 2) provide evidence that groups agreeing on a 
payment per head of livestock made higher payments than groups agreeing on no 
rule. In a similar way groups adopting the equal payment per person also paid more. 
The models confirm that in the face of higher variance of livestock endowments 
within groups, adopting the rule to pay per livestock does not increase payments 
(see interaction term, Table 2). The models for the overall game even indicate a 
negative relationship.
Correlation analysis indicates that players who consciously agreed to the 
payment system per person made larger water contributions than players who 
informally adjusted their payments to the payments of other players (Pearson 
r=0.566, p=0.014, N=18). Also players who consciously agreed on a payment 
system per head of livestock tend to make higher payments compared to players 
informally adjusting their payments to the distribution of livestock within the group 
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(Pearson r=0.551, p=0.099, N=10). Nevertheless, the people formally following a 
rule and the ones informally following a norm had similar overall water expenses 
per livestock unit (individual payments plus breakdown fees) (P-values for two-
tailed t-test are 0.36 and 0.18 for payment per person and payment per head of 
livestock respectively). It is interesting to note that farmers with smaller livestock 
numbers have been more reluctant to explicitly commit to any rule (Pearson r=–
0.3911, p=0.008, n=45). Mainly owners of larger herds formalised the rule of 
equal payment per farmer while owners of smaller herds rather adjusted their 
payments informally to the other players’ payments (Pearson r=0.4691, p=0.050, 
n=18). One should keep in mind that in groups with heterogeneous livestock 
ownership the farmers with large herds are favoured by the equal payment per 
farmer.
Having learned about the payment behaviour still leaves the question open 
whether the rule formation had an impact on the ecological and economic outcomes 
of the farmers in the games. We count together the individual payments into the 
water fund and the individual fees paid in cases of infrastructure breakdowns. 
These two amounts together are the farmers’ total water expenses. We can see that 
the total water expenses per livestock unit are likely to be lower for the farmers 
who agreed on a rule compared to the ones not having agreed (means of 952 N$/
LSU and 2397 N$/LSU respectively; P-value for two-tailed t-test is 0.08). There 
are no significant differences between the two payment systems. We further see 
that in situations with more homogeneous livestock possessions players tended to 
make higher contributions to the group fund (Pearson r=–0. 580, p=0.000, n=45) 
and had lower overall water expenses per livestock unit (individual payments plus 
breakdown fees) (Pearson r=–0.4 36, p=0.003, n=45).
We cannot observe any impact of the rule formation on the total game income 
or changes in the value of the herd. The design of the underlying system model 
gives the stocking decisions a much stronger weight on these outcome variables 
than the water payments. This is actually also true for the state of the pasture. We 
observe, however, that the players agreeing to a rule degraded their pasture much 
more than the ones not agreeing (P-value for two-tailed t-test is 0.03; no differences 
between payment rules). Nevertheless, it would be bold to assume causality in this 
regard. Correlation analysis indicates that farmers with larger livestock numbers 
more likely agreed to a payment rule. Independent from the water payments these 
farmers are more likely to put stronger pressure on the pastures.
Looking at the individual control variables provides some interesting 
results. Female players made lower contributions than their male counterparts. 
Beneficiaries with more real-life human and financial capital as well as better 
farming productivity made relatively higher contributions in the game.
Our Mixed-Effects regressions give some encouraging results indicating a 
high external validity of our game. Firstly, farmers who made bigger real life 
investments into water infrastructure also made higher contributions in the game. 
Secondly, players farming on units where the water infrastructure is in fact better 
maintained also contributed higher amounts in the role-play (Table 2). We asked 
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our respondents how many pumps they have on their farm and how many pumps 
are indeed working with the result that the larger the share of working pumps the 
higher the payments.
6. Discussion and conclusion
We observe in our game relatively high levels of cooperation and no consequent 
free riding. These results are likely to be effected by the accessibility of social 
information on individual payment levels. Our main motivation to make payments 
transparent was to increase the external validity. There is a low degree of privacy in 
the researched communities. According to Carpenter and Seki (2011) and Henrich 
et al. (2010) participant behaviour in experimental settings is based on their real-
life experiences. The participants in our role-plays share in real life the same 
water infrastructure and the joint management of this infrastructure is a typical 
challenge for them. Furthermore, they can easily observe each other’s actions.
Revealing the individual payments very likely makes players adjust their 
payments to what they believe is approved by fellow players. Not to free-ride 
might be motivated by avoiding shame. Our design does, however, not allow us 
to draw conclusions about the effect of the anticipated approval or disapproval on 
the players’ decisions.
The rule of payment per head of livestock has only been consciously agreed 
upon by one group in our role-play, while five groups adopted the rule of equal 
payment per person. This tendency can possibly be explained by the transaction 
costs of monitoring livestock numbers which is necessary to determine the 
individual payments. In each round of the game the payment has to be adopted 
to reflect the changing livestock numbers, while the amount is fixed under the 
rule of equal payment per person. In theory, a system of equal payment per 
person achieves a relatively high congruence of provision and appropriation if 
the variance of livestock endowment in a group is low. Since the payments under 
both rules match in groups with a relatively equal distribution of endowments, 
these groups are more likely to cooperate. We can clearly observe that groups 
with a lower variance in livestock endowment are more likely to reach a payment 
agreement. However, they generally choose the rule of equal payment per person.
It is not seen that groups with a greater variance of livestock endowment are 
more likely to adopt the rule of payment per head of livestock. Does this empirical 
result allow us to reject Proposition 4? We do observe implicit norms of congruence 
of provision and appropriation. Independent of whether groups came to an 
agreement on a payment system, players owning more livestock tend to make higher 
contributions. Furthermore, players confronted with situations of unequal livestock 
distribution were more likely to informally adjust their payments to reflect their 
number of livestock. This result suggests the possibility that our players avoided the 
formalisation of a rule achieving high congruence of provision and appropriation 
due to the higher transaction costs associated with it. Despite this fact, a share of 
the players demonstrated a fairness norm suggesting an autonomous and informal 
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adaptation of provision efforts to appropriation level. Nevertheless, more research is 
needed in order to reach a convincing conclusion on Proposition 4.
Our role-plays simulated a real life cooperation situation using a social-
ecological model. The virtual environment was sufficiently similar to reality, but 
simple enough to be played (Gurung et al. 2006). In this way, we increase the 
potential for players to learn about the real-life behaviour of one another through 
the role-play. Using the terminology of Roe and Just (2009), we increase our 
ecological validity to the extent that the context of the research is similar to the 
context of interest. As a consequence, the possibility to replicate our results is 
limited. Nevertheless, playing with subjects who actually experience similar 
decisions as represented in the game allows us to make specific statements about 
their behaviour. We see it as an indicator for the success of our approach that 
individuals who made higher payments in the role-plays also manage to keep their 
real-life infrastructure in better condition.
The simulation-model based role-plays produced not only knowledge but 
provided support to stakeholders in their decision making (Barreteau et al. 2001; 
Barreteau 2003; Gurung et al. 2006; Guyot and Honiden 2006; Becu et al. 2008). 
There was uniform response from the participants that they perceived the exercise 
as training rather than research activity. Gurung et al. (2006) emphasizes that 
one key objective of participatory modelling is to facilitate dialogue, shared 
learning, and collective decision making through interdisciplinary research; thus, 
strengthening the adaptive management capacity of local communities. Modelling 
in combination with role-plays is a way to experiment with rules and strategies 
and, in this way, explore probable ecological and economic consequences. It 
limits the costs of trial and error methods and shifts the approach from costly 
learning by doing towards learning by simulating (Barreteau et al. 2001). Our 
approach simultaneously deepens the understanding of cooperation processes 
and encourages discussion and institution building. In this sense, we supported 
Namibian land reform beneficiaries in a current and relevant challenge. It 
would have been difficult to measure any impact of our research given the small 
sample and methodological limitations. Nevertheless, we believe that our work 
demonstrates the potential of the research approach to contribute to achieving 
more productive, sustainable and resilient agricultural development. Future 
research should also focus on measuring such impact.
The authors acknowledge that this study can only provide a snap shot picture. 
The role-play approach was intended to assess decisions that are taken over a long 
period of time within a few hours which is a clear advantage of this method. Of 
course this could also be a limitation as real life decision processes are much more 
complex than the ones which can be modelled in a role-play.
Which policy implications can be drawn from our research? First of all, the 
research confirms the ongoing challenge of institution building faced by land reform 
beneficiaries. This is not a short-term issue anymore as some of the beneficiaries 
were resettled more than 20 years ago. Government and non-government extension 
services currently have a strong focus on developing farmers’ technical skills. 
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Institutional capacity development in pre- and post-resettlement support needs more 
attention. This is a challenging process as there are no standard rules which fit all 
cases. Currently the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry mainly promotes 
the payment system per head of livestock. Our research indicates, however, that 
this rule is not necessarily the most preferred one.
The process of rule negotiation has to be open to the preferences of different 
groups and their specific circumstances. Given the difficulties to externally 
enforce by-laws of FURS groups it is important that the groups strongly support 
a rule on a moral and social basis (see also Falk et al. 2012). But maybe the loose 
social relations are also a chance. Schnegg and Linke (2015) show that social 
networks can actually hamper the effectiveness of water management institutions. 
The specific context also raises the question whether institutions indeed have to 
be always formalised. Why should groups formalize what they are doing anyway? 
There is always the risk that formalisation crowds out clearly observable informal 
norms (see e.g. Cardenas et al. 2000; Vollan 2008; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes 
2012). At the same time, why are farmers not prepared to formalize what they 
are doing anyway? In our games the people agreeing to a rule had overall 
lower expenses for water per livestock unit compared to the ones who followed 
informal norms only. It seems, however, that in particular smaller farmers fell 
less comfortable with committing to formal rules. Are they more worried that 
the rules turn against them? Is it more difficult for them to assert their interests 
in negotiations on the formalisation of rules? Our study cannot answer these 
questions but it can create awareness for the fact that in the process of institutional 
capacity development special attention should be paid to owners of smaller herds.
Another important policy implication of our research is the need to pay 
special attention to less homogenous groups in terms of livestock endowments. 
The Ministry of Lands and Resettlement could consider taking the heterogeneity 
of livestock ownership into account when allocating land units.
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APPENDIX 1: Summary of the Social-Ecological-Technical 
System of the Omaheke Region/Namibia in the context 
of land reform beneficiaries’ joint provision of water
Cooperation patterns of land reform beneficiaries in water management are the 
outcome of complex features of social-ecological systems (SES). We structure our 
explorative assessment according to the latest SES framework version of McGinnis 
and Ostrom (2014), into the main sub-systems: (i) Social, Economic, and Political 
Setting (S), (ii) the Resource System (RS) and Resource Units (RU), (ii) the 
Governance System (GS), (iii) and the Actors (A). Throughout this appendix we 
refer to the codes of the second tier SES variables according to the latest framework 
version. A more structured summary of the SES is given in Table A1.2.
We do not present a separate section to processes and activities as interactions 
(I) between the above mentioned sub-systems. Instead, we will refer to interactions 
when talking about the resource system, the governance system and the actors. It 
is important to keep in mind, however, that the main interest of our research is 
to understand how FURS beneficiaries invest in the collective good water supply 
(I5) which is the outcome of complex interactions within the SES.
Social, Economic, and Political Setting (S)
Our study focuses on commercial land reform in Namibia6, where farmland is 
redistributed to groups previously subject to discrimination. The reform has to 
be seen in a historical context. Prior to colonial rule, pastoralist communities 
used the land in central Namibia, our research area. As a consequence of spatially 
and temporally highly variable biomass availability, these groups were dispersed 
widely over the territory in order to manage pastures efficiently. In the late 19th 
century, colonialists acquired practically the whole area used by these communities 
(Werner 1993). Linked to this development were the transformation of communal 
property regimes into private ones and the introduction of formal land titles. After 
6
 A communal land reform programme is also under way, which formalizes and partly privatizes 
common property rights, in communal areas. This process is, however, not subject of this paper.
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South Africa received the mandate over Namibia in 1919, it established relatively 
small, communally managed reserves for black Namibians (Werner 1993). By 
the time of independence in 1990, approximately 4200 – predominantly white 
– farming households held 52% of the agricultural land under freehold titles. At 
the same time, 48% of Namibia’s farm land supported 70% of the population 
(Kaukungua et al. 2004). The colonial expropriation of black Namibians from land 
was a key factor for the design of the overall economic system. It provided white 
settlers with land, strongly restricted black Namibians’ access to the resources 
they so heavily relied on, and in this way forced them into exploitative wage labor 
relations in the mining and industrial sectors (Werner 1993).
The Namibian government intends to achieve a mixture of political, social 
and economic goals with land reform. The key objective is to increase the 
income of citizens who were previously discriminated against by apartheid and 
other colonial policies. Furthermore, land reform is expected to contribute to 
political stability, poverty alleviation, the stimulation of agricultural and rural 
development, and growth (Kaukungua et al. 2004; Werner 2004; LAC 2005; 
Werner and Kruger 2007; RoN 2010; Werner and Odendaal 2010). The Namibian 
resettlement policy stipulates that the reform is to redress past imbalances in the 
distribution of economic resources, particularly land; create employment through 
full-time farming; alleviate human and livestock pressure in the communal areas; 
and offer previously disadvantaged social groups an opportunity to reintegrate 
into mainstream society and the economy (RoN 2001, 2010). In this context it 
should be noted that the reform’s focus shifted in the late 1990s from poverty 
alleviation towards taking also agricultural productivity into account. The reliance 
on willing-seller–willing-buyer policies is strongly supported by the international 
community. It is seen as one factor contributing to peaceful land redistribution. 
Others criticized that willing-seller–willing-buyer policies hinder a consequent 
pro-poor asset distribution. There is also opposition to elite capture, which pushes 
Figure A1.1: Time-line overview of the Namibian land reform process.
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poverty groups out of the reform process. Figure A1.1 summarizes the reform 
process and illustrates the shift towards economic objectives.
Resource system (RS) and resource units (RU)
Our research was conducted in the Omaheke region in east central Namibia (RS9). 
The vegetation is dominated by an Acacia-Terminalia tree-and-shrub savannah of 
the Central Kalahari (Mendelsohn et al. 2002). FURS land reform beneficiaries, 
in our sample, farm with livestock, mainly cattle, and operate in a commercial 
farming setting (RS1). The Omaheke region is considered to be a high-potential 
livestock farming area in Namibia with approximately 350 mm rainfall per year 
on average. Precipitation is spatially and temporally highly variable (Olbrich 
2012) (RS5, RS7). The Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry recommends 
a stocking rate between 12 and 18 ha/LSU (Mendelsohn 2006) (RS5).
The farm unit clusters are clearly marked and fenced. FURS farmers are 
allotted individually fenced shares of the cluster (RS2). The clear boundaries 
ensure that groups of FURS farmers, sharing the same water points, effectively 
exclude outsiders from accessing their water. It is difficult, however, to exclude 
farmers within the cluster from water access. This creates incentives to free ride 
with regard to contributions to water-infrastructure maintenance (RS3, I4, I5).
In our sample, the clusters consist of six farm units at maximum (RS3). The 
size of the individual farm units ranges between 50 ha and 2000 ha and the size 
of studied farm clusters varies between approximately 750 ha and 4.600 ha which 
is far below the average of commercial farm sizes in Omaheke (Olbrich 2012). 
Concerns have repeatedly been expressed that beneficiaries are allotted land units 
that are too small and, thus, not economically viable (Werner and Odendaal 2010).
In the context of water infrastructure maintenance, more significant economies 
of scale can be realized on larger farm clusters. This is relevant, as Namibia is one 
of the driest countries in the world and water access is an essential precondition 
for any land use (RU4). The water is pumped almost exclusively from aquifers. 
Some of them are recharged by rain, but Namibia also holds significant fossil 
groundwater reservoirs (RU2). In Omaheke, mainly diesel and wind pumps are 
used to access ground water (RS4). Farm clusters in our sample, jointly use one 
to four pumps (RU5). One pump serves between 375 and 4300 ha (RU4, RU7). 
Livestock is the main consumer of water at the researched FURS farms with 
an estimated water demand for a single farmer’s herd ranging between 125 and 
3500 litres per day (I1). The water access points, in terms of water infrastructure, 
are totally immobile and therefore land reform beneficiaries do not face typical 
challenges associated with high resource mobility (RU1).
In the absence of permanent open water sources, a breakdown of water 
infrastructure leads to livestock losses and significant costs. If water infrastructure 
breaks down, farmers are forced to ask for water access at neighbouring farms. Usually 
fees need to be paid for such water access, and longer routes to water points contribute 
significant stress to the animals (RU4). Many water points have a small reservoir with 
a capacity sufficient to store the water demand for only a few days (RS8).
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Governance system (GS)
Namibia is a constitutional democracy with a dominant party (the SWAPO Party 
of Namibia). It has been politically stable since its independence from South 
Africa in 1990 (S3).
Land Reform is an important policy for Namibia as it not only mediates unfair 
land distribution, but also maintains political stability in the country. For more than 
18 years, land has been redistributed to previously disadvantaged groups of the 
Namibian society using a broad range of instruments, such as group resettlement, 
subsidized loans, redistribution of government land and, in a few cases, expropriation. 
In this paper, we focus on the Farm Unit Resettlement Scheme (FURS) which is based 
on the willing-seller willing-buyer principle. The Namibian state uses preferential 
acquisition right to purchase suitable agricultural land whenever any owner of such 
land intends to dispose of it (RoN 1995). The Ministry of Lands and Resettlement 
(GS1) divides the farms into smaller portions and any Namibian citizen who has 
been socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory 
laws can apply for an allotment of land acquired for resettlement (e.g. RoN 2002). 
Successful applicants are supposed to receive a 99-year lease agreement with the 
government. We observe, however, that by 2008 39% of the FURS farmers in our 
sample did not hold a leasing contract. These beneficiaries, therefore, have no written 
proof of their rights to the allotted land; therefore, causing negative consequences on 
their tenure security (Falk et al. 2010; Werner and Odendaal 2010) (GS4).
Tenure security is strongly linked to water supply. The government can only sign 
leasehold agreements once a full repair of farm infrastructure has been completed. 
Unclear responsibilities between the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry, the FURS beneficiaries and capacity 
constraints on all sides delay this process (GS1, I5).
The collective action situation on FURS farm clusters is strongly shaped by the 
process of land redistribution. The splitting of larger farms, that were previously 
centrally managed, into smaller farm units means that beneficiaries do not have 
exclusive access to water infrastructure. They are forced to cooperate with 
their neighbouring farmers on the farm cluster (GS3, I7). The sharing of water 
infrastructure is even emphasized in the lease agreement. In addition, FURS land 
reform beneficiaries enter the cooperation arena solely on the basis of bureaucratic 
land allocation decisions made by the Ministry of Lands. They have no say as 
to whom they cooperate with, do not know their future cooperation partners 
(GS3), and, therefore, cannot rely on a history of social interaction (A3). As a 
consequence, cooperation agreements can be achieved only on the basis of active 
self-organised deliberation processes on water provision and appropriation rules 
(I3, I7). We are not aware of any significant process facilitation by government or 
NGO extension services (GS1, GS2).
This situation strongly influences the institutional setting within the clusters. 
Constitutional and collective choice rules are not existent (GS7, GS8) at the 
time of land redistribution. The lease agreement prescribes only that the land 
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reform beneficiaries of a farm cluster are obliged to share water infrastructure. 
The initial absence of constitutional and collective choice rules does not support 
the efficient creation of operational rules. The lease agreement makes some 
operational provisions even though they are confusing. According to the lease 
agreement, the Ministry of Lands is still responsible for the maintenance of the 
infrastructure. At the same time, land reform beneficiaries are obliged to keep the 
water infrastructure in the same state as it was when the farm was handed over. 
Taking into account that lease agreements are signed for a 99 year period, this 
raises questions about who is responsible for the general maintenance (GS6, I5).
In reality, the government is extremely slow in responding to requests to 
maintain water infrastructure. If farmers do not want to risk losing animals in case 
of infrastructure breakdowns, they have to repair it themselves (I5) on the basis 
of their own rules (GS6).
In our research region, there are two typical operational rules with regard to 
contributions to infrastructure maintenance. Either farmers pay an equal fixed 
amount or they calculate a fee per head of livestock. The second rule supports 
congruence of provision and appropriation which is considered to be more fair 
and sustainable and is also promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture (GS6, A6).
Land reform beneficiaries need to obtain the ministry’s permission for any 
infrastructure improvements. The government is reluctant to give this permission 
because it would have to compensate the farmer for any improvements once the 
agreement expires or is terminated.
Contributions to the maintenance of water infrastructure are easy to monitor 
within the small groups. A challenge can be, however, to assess the herd size of 
each farmer which is necessary if payments are linked to livestock numbers. The 
farm units are usually large and densely vegetated, such that it is not easy to count 
the herd. The implementation of a rule ensuring higher congruence of provision 
and appropriation, therefore, causes additional transaction costs (GS8, I9).
Sanctioning is very difficult within the groups. The lease agreements do not 
allow restrictions of water access which could be a mechanism to sanction free 
riders. Since newly emerging rules are not formalised they cannot be enforced 
using state authority. Neither civil society organisations nor traditional authorities 
play an important role in the governance of FURS farms. The latter is partly 
attributed to the fact that the groups are multi-ethnic. As such, the groups can only 
use social pressure as a sanctioning mechanism (GS8).
The Omaheke Region is known as Namibia’s “Cattle Country” producing 
high-quality meat for the national, regional and international market. With regard 
to various aspects of agriculture, Namibian farmers strongly depend on South 
African markets. For instance, nearly 50% of Namibian cattle farmers’ livestock-
offtake are weaners sold alive to feedlots in South Africa. This explains why 
commercial livestock farmers are afraid of unfavourable developments in the 
input, output and labour markets (Olbrich 2012). The Namibian government is 
attempting to encourage domestic value addition. Strong new market incentives 
have evolved from Angola, where significant amounts of financial capital circulate 
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and whose farmers are restocking their herds following the end of the civil war 
in 2002 (S5).
Land users as actors (A)
In 2008, Namibia had a Human Development Index of 0.613 which is well above 
the average for sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 2010). Namibians’ average gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita was US$6600 in 2009. The country has one of 
the most unequal income distributions in the world (UNDP 2010). Approximately 
30% of Omaheke’s population is poor, and 18% are classified as severely poor 
(RoN 2008) (S1).
In 2011, the Namibian population was 2,104,900 persons. Between 2001 and 
2011 it has been growing by 15% (RoN 2012). In 2011, 70,800 people lived in the 
Omaheke Region. The population density for the same year was 0.8 people per 
km² (RoN 2012) (S2).
Our sample consists of individual farmers using one farm unit exclusively. 
Table A1.1 summarizes the basic descriptive statistics of our sample. By 2008, the 
beneficiaries in our sample had been granted access to their farming units between 
1 and 23 years prior (A3). The majority of respondents (82%) use the farm units 
for more than 4 years. This means they have already had considerable time to 
develop infrastructure maintenance rules.
The government’s selection criteria for FURS beneficiaries have repeatedly 
changed, but the program generally focuses on the poor. Sixty per cent of the 
heads of household within the sample are permanently present on the farm and 
consider themselves to be full-time farmers. Nevertheless, 80% of the respondents 
claim to have non-farm income.
Many land reform beneficiaries struggle to generate income from their farms. 
In 2008, 45% of the sample managed to make a profit before investment costs, 
and only one third had a positive marginal farm income after investment costs 
were taken into account (see also Figure A1.2; there are two missing values from 
our sample). Such losses are in sharp contrast to Olbrich’s (2012) numbers for 
Table A1.1: Descriptive statistics of sample (the game was played with 45 farmers, but for two 
of them not all socio-economic data could be collected).
n score
Mean of age 43 55
Share of male respondents 45 60%
Education (share which attended primary school) 43 86%
Education (share which attended secondary school) 43 49%
Share of dominant ethnic group 45 53%
Total number of ethnicities 45 5
Share having previous farming experience 43 72%
Share having commercial farming experience 43 26%
Average years since resettlement 43 9
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commercial cattle farmers in Namibia. In his sample, 84% had an income of more 
than 40% above the national per capita average per year.
Forty-four per cent of the heads of household did not finish secondary school, 
47% finished secondary school as the highest degree, and 9% hold a technical 
or university degree. Seventy-two per cent of our sample had previous farming 
experience, but only a minority of them in a commercial setting. Only 23% of 
the respondents received some kind of farming-training (A2, A7). These figures 
indicate that land reform beneficiaries are significantly less educated than 
established commercial farmers (Olbrich 2012).
Many farmers are organized into unions (GS2, A6, I8), with the Namibia 
Agricultural Union (NAU) mainly representing the established commercial 
farmers, and the Namibia Emerging Commercial Farmers’ Forum (NECFF) 
addressing the needs of land reform beneficiaries. The unions engage in 
knowledge exchange (I2) and capacity development, lobbying (I6) and research, 
and supporting various marketing activities. We did not become aware of any 
leadership structures (A5).
The size of the groups in our sample sharing water infrastructure ranged from 
two to six. In 43% of the groups, more than one ethnic group was represented with 
a maximum of 3 ethnicities being represented.
The main technologies used to supply the farms with water are wind and diesel 
pumps. Only one electric and one solar pump were recorded in our sample. An 
important difference between diesel and wind pumps are the higher running costs of 
diesel engines. Fuel and oil needs to be continuously provided in order to ensure water 
supply. Diesel pumps are more costly in terms of maintenance, but they are also more 
powerful. We have no data available regarding the costs per pumped litre of water.
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
N=43; own figure
Total marginal farm income per year (excluding investments)
Total marginal farm income per year (including investments)
M
ar
gi
na
l f
ar
m
 in
co
m
e 
in
 2
00
8 
in
   
 1
00
0
Figure A1.2: Farm income calculations.
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s o
f s
ca
le
 c
an
 b
e 
re
al
iz
ed
 o
n 
la
rg
er
 fa
rm
 c
lu
ste
rs
.
In
 o
ur
 a
na
ly
sis
, w
e 
co
nt
ro
l f
or
 th
e 
siz
e 
of
 
ea
ch
 fa
rm
 u
ni
t.
R
S4
 –
H
um
an
-
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s
N
am
ib
ia
 is
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 d
rie
st 
co
un
tri
es
 in
 th
e 
w
or
ld
 a
nd
 w
at
er
 a
cc
es
s i
s a
n 
es
se
nt
ia
l p
re
co
nd
iti
on
 
fo
r a
ny
 la
nd
 u
se
. I
n 
O
m
ah
ek
e,
 m
ai
nl
y 
di
es
el
 a
nd
 w
in
d 
pu
m
ps
 a
re
 u
se
d 
to
 a
cc
es
s g
ro
un
d 
w
at
er
.
 
In
 th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 p
er
m
an
en
t o
pe
n 
w
at
er
 so
ur
ce
s a
 b
re
ak
do
w
n 
of
 th
is 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 le
ad
s t
o 
liv
es
to
ck
 lo
ss
es
 a
nd
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 c
os
ts.
 O
n 
FU
RS
 fa
rm
s, 
th
e 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 –
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 w
at
er
 
po
in
ts 
– 
ar
e 
su
pp
os
ed
 to
 b
e 
fu
lly
 m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
by
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t b
ef
or
e 
la
nd
 re
di
str
ib
ut
io
n.
 In
 
20
08
, b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s i
n 
ou
r s
am
pl
e 
in
ve
ste
d 
be
tw
ee
n 
0.
20
 a
nd
 4
6.
27
 +
/h
a 
in
 v
eh
ic
le
s, 
m
ac
hi
ne
ry
,
 
fe
nc
es
, w
at
er
 p
oi
nt
s, 
ho
us
es
, e
ne
rg
y 
su
pp
ly
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
, a
nd
 to
ol
s. 
O
ur
 st
ud
y 
fo
cu
se
s o
n 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
. 
W
e 
tr
y 
to
 e
xp
la
in
 th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
 c
on
tri
bu
tio
ns
 
to
 th
e 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 in
 a
 
gr
ou
p 
of
 w
at
er
 u
se
rs
.
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Sy
ste
m
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s i
n 
th
e 
N
am
ib
ia
n 
la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 c
on
te
xt
Co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
in
 o
ur
 a
na
ly
sis
 o
f l
an
d 
re
fo
rm
 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s’ 
joi
nt 
pro
vis
ion
 of
 w
ate
r
R
S5
 –
 P
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
o
f s
ys
te
m
, a
nd
 
R
S6
 –
 E
qu
ili
br
iu
m
 
pr
op
er
tie
s
Th
e 
O
m
ah
ek
e 
re
gi
on
 is
 c
on
sid
er
ed
 to
 b
e 
a 
hi
gh
-p
ot
en
tia
l l
iv
es
to
ck
 fa
rm
in
g 
ar
ea
 in
 N
am
ib
ia
, 
w
ith
 a
pp
ro
xi
m
at
el
y 
35
0 
m
m
 ra
in
fa
ll 
on
 av
er
ag
e p
er
 y
ea
r. 
Pr
ec
ip
ita
tio
n 
is 
sp
at
ia
lly
 a
nd
 
te
m
po
ra
lly
 h
ig
hl
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
(O
lbr
ich
 20
12
).
M
os
t o
f t
he
 la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 fa
rm
s a
re
 in
 a
 c
om
pa
ra
tiv
el
y 
po
or
 e
co
lo
gi
ca
l s
ta
te
. R
es
to
ra
tio
n 
of
 a
nd
 
tr
an
sit
io
n 
of
 ra
ng
el
an
d 
to
 a
n 
im
pr
ov
ed
 st
at
e 
is 
m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
th
an
 a
 fu
rth
er
 d
et
er
io
ra
tio
n 
o
f t
he
 la
nd
 (F
alk
 et
 
al
. 2
01
0).
A 
w
el
l m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 c
an
 p
re
ve
nt
 lo
ca
liz
ed
 p
as
tu
re
 d
eg
ra
da
tio
n 
as
 li
ve
sto
ck
 c
an
 b
e 
di
str
ib
ut
ed
 m
or
e 
w
id
el
y 
on
 th
e 
fa
rm
.
Th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 in
flu
en
ce
s 
pa
stu
re
 d
eg
ra
da
tio
n 
un
de
rli
ne
s, 
am
on
gs
t 
o
th
er
 fa
ct
or
s, 
th
e 
re
le
va
nc
e 
of
 o
ur
 re
se
ar
ch
. 
It 
is,
 h
ow
ev
er
,
 
n
o
t i
n 
th
e 
fo
cu
s o
f t
hi
s s
tu
dy
 
to
 b
et
te
r u
nd
er
sta
nd
 th
e 
de
ta
ils
 o
f t
hi
s 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
R
S7
 –
 P
re
di
ct
ab
ili
ty
 
o
f s
ys
te
m
 d
yn
am
ic
s
Th
e 
hi
gh
 sp
at
ia
l a
nd
 te
m
po
ra
l v
ar
ia
bi
lit
y 
of
 ra
in
fa
ll 
le
ad
s t
o 
un
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e 
bi
om
as
s p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(se
e a
lso
 O
lbr
ich
 20
12
). D
rou
gh
t y
ea
rs 
ca
n l
ea
d t
o l
iqu
idi
ty 
sh
ort
ag
es 
an
d t
he
 te
mp
ora
l 
u
n
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
of
 c
as
h 
ne
ed
ed
 to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
.
A
no
th
er
 im
po
rta
nt
 so
ur
ce
 o
f u
np
re
di
ct
ab
ili
ty
 is
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 fa
rm
er
s c
an
no
t p
re
di
ct
 w
he
n 
w
at
er
 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 b
re
ak
s d
ow
n.
 T
he
y 
ha
ve
 to
 ta
ke
 p
re
ca
ut
io
n 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 a
vo
id
 e
ve
n 
te
m
po
ra
l w
at
er
 
sh
or
ta
ge
s.
W
e 
co
n
sid
er
 u
np
re
di
ct
ab
le
 re
so
ur
ce
 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
to
 b
e 
an
 im
po
rta
nt
 a
sp
ec
t o
f 
th
e 
O
m
ah
ek
e 
fa
rm
in
g 
sy
ste
m
. T
he
re
fo
re
, 
it 
is 
str
on
gl
y 
re
fle
ct
ed
 in
 o
ur
 ro
le
-p
la
ys
. 
Th
e 
ro
le
-p
la
ys
 a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
a 
so
ci
al
-
ec
o
lo
gi
ca
l-s
im
ul
at
io
n 
m
od
el
. T
he
 m
od
el
 
ra
n
do
m
ly
 c
al
cu
la
te
s t
he
 ra
in
fa
ll 
an
d 
w
at
er
 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 b
re
ak
do
w
ns
.
R
S8
 –
 S
to
ra
ge
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
M
os
t w
at
er
 p
oi
nt
s h
av
e 
a 
re
se
rv
oi
r w
hi
ch
 c
an
 st
or
e 
w
at
er
 fo
r a
 li
m
ite
d 
pe
rio
d 
of
 ti
m
e.
 L
ar
ge
r 
re
se
rv
o
irs
 c
an
 p
ot
en
tia
lly
 m
iti
ga
te
 th
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s o
f p
um
p 
br
ea
kd
ow
n 
as
 th
e 
fa
rm
er
s h
av
e 
m
o
re
 ti
m
e 
to
 re
pa
ir 
th
e 
pu
m
p 
w
ith
ou
t f
ac
in
g 
w
at
er
 sh
or
ta
ge
.
St
an
di
ng
 p
al
at
ab
le
 b
io
m
as
s c
an
 b
e 
us
ed
 u
nt
il 
it 
ha
s b
ee
n 
co
ns
um
ed
 o
r b
ur
ne
d.
W
e 
do
 n
ot
 d
ist
in
gu
ish
 in
 o
ur
 st
ud
y 
be
tw
ee
n 
pu
m
p 
an
d 
re
se
rv
oi
r i
nf
ra
str
uc
tu
re
 a
s s
to
ra
ge
 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s a
re
 g
en
er
al
ly
 sm
al
l.
R
S9
 –
 L
oc
at
io
n
Th
e 
O
m
ah
ek
e 
re
gi
on
 is
 si
tu
at
ed
 in
 e
as
t-c
en
tra
l N
am
ib
ia
.
Fa
rm
 u
ni
ts 
of
 a
 fa
rm
 c
lu
ste
r a
re
 lo
ca
te
d 
ar
ou
nd
 a
 w
at
er
 p
oi
nt
 g
iv
in
g 
al
l f
ar
m
er
s d
ire
ct
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
th
e 
w
at
er
 so
ur
ce
.
W
e 
ca
n
n
o
t s
ee
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l i
m
pa
ct
s o
f f
ar
m
 
lo
ca
tio
n 
on
 th
e 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
of
 la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s i
n 
th
e 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
f w
at
er
 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
.
Ta
bl
e A
1.
2:
 
(co
nit
nu
ed
)
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Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s i
n 
th
e 
N
am
ib
ia
n 
la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 c
on
te
xt
Co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
in
 o
ur
 a
na
ly
sis
 o
f l
an
d 
re
fo
rm
 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s’ 
joi
nt 
pro
vis
ion
 of
 w
ate
r
Re
so
ur
ce
 U
ni
ts 
(R
U)
R
U
1 
– 
Re
so
ur
ce
 u
ni
t 
m
o
bi
lit
y
Fo
r t
he
 id
en
tifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 R
es
ou
rc
e 
U
ni
t, 
w
e 
as
k 
ou
rs
el
ve
s w
hi
ch
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
go
od
s 
ar
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
of
 b
en
efi
ts 
fro
m
 th
e 
fa
rm
s (
see
 H
ink
el 
et 
al
. 2
01
5).
 Th
e 
cr
iti
ca
l 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
go
od
 is
, i
n 
ou
r c
as
e,
 th
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 w
at
er
.
 
W
at
er
 s
up
pl
y 
is,
 h
ow
ev
er
,
 
di
re
ct
ly
 li
nk
ed
 to
 
th
e 
pr
ov
isi
on
 o
f w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
. I
t i
s t
he
re
fo
re
 in
str
um
en
ta
l f
or
 o
ur
 st
ud
y 
to
 c
on
sid
er
 th
e 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 b
ei
ng
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 R
es
ou
rc
e 
U
ni
t. 
Th
is 
de
m
on
str
at
es
 th
at
 o
ur
 c
as
e 
re
qu
ire
s 
a 
so
ci
al
-e
co
lo
gi
ca
l-t
ec
hn
ic
al
 sy
ste
m
 (S
ET
S)
 pe
rsp
ec
tiv
e.
Th
e 
w
at
er
 fl
ow
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
in
te
rp
re
te
d 
as
 h
ig
h 
re
so
ur
ce
 u
ni
t m
ob
ili
ty
.
 
N
ev
er
th
el
es
s, 
th
e 
w
at
er
 
ac
ce
ss
 p
oi
nt
s, 
in
 te
rm
s o
f w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
, a
re
 to
ta
lly
 im
m
ob
ile
 a
nd
 th
er
ef
or
e 
la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s d
o 
no
t f
ac
e 
ty
pi
ca
l c
ha
lle
ng
es
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 h
ig
h 
re
so
ur
ce
 m
ob
ili
ty
.
Th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 o
ur
 sa
m
pl
e 
th
er
e 
is 
lo
w
 re
so
ur
ce
 
u
n
it 
m
ob
ili
ty
.
 
W
e 
th
er
ef
or
e 
do
 n
ot
 fo
cu
s o
n 
th
is 
as
pe
ct
 in
 o
ur
 st
ud
y.
R
U
2 
– 
G
ro
w
th
 o
r 
re
pl
ac
em
en
t r
at
e
Th
e 
w
at
er
 is
 p
um
pe
d 
fro
m
 a
qu
ife
rs
. S
om
e 
of
 th
em
 a
re
 re
ch
ar
ge
d 
by
 ra
in
 b
ut
 N
am
ib
ia
 a
lso
 
ho
ld
s s
ig
ni
fic
an
t f
os
sil
 g
ro
un
dw
at
er
 re
se
rv
oi
rs
. M
os
t o
f t
he
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
w
at
er
 is
 u
se
d 
fo
r l
iv
es
to
ck
 
w
hi
ch
 is
 fa
rm
ed
 e
xt
en
siv
el
y. 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 o
nl
y 
m
od
er
at
e 
am
ou
nt
s o
f w
at
er
 a
re
 e
xt
ra
ct
ed
. T
he
 
hy
dr
ol
og
ic
al
 sy
ste
m
 is
 st
ill
 p
oo
rly
 u
nd
er
sto
od
.
Th
e 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 d
oe
s n
ot
 re
ge
ne
ra
te
 w
ith
ou
t h
um
an
 su
pp
or
t.
Po
or
 d
at
a 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
lim
ite
d 
th
e 
po
ss
ib
ili
ty
 
o
f c
on
sid
er
in
g 
th
e 
hy
dr
ol
og
ic
al
 re
pl
ac
em
en
t 
dy
na
m
ic
s. 
W
e 
th
er
ef
or
e 
co
ul
d 
no
t t
ak
e 
th
is 
as
pe
ct
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
.
R
U
3 
– 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
am
o
n
g 
re
so
ur
ce
 u
ni
ts
W
e 
ar
e 
n
o
t a
w
ar
e 
of
 a
ny
 in
te
ra
ct
io
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
w
at
er
 u
ni
ts 
or
 b
et
w
ee
n 
w
at
er
 p
oi
nt
s.
Th
is 
as
pe
ct
 is
 n
ot
 re
le
va
nt
 in
 th
e 
co
nt
ex
t o
f 
o
u
r 
st
ud
y.
R
U
4 
– 
Ec
on
om
ic
 
v
al
ue
Th
e 
O
m
ah
ek
e 
ha
rd
ly
 h
ol
ds
 a
ny
 su
rfa
ce
 w
at
er
 so
ur
ce
s. 
Fa
rm
in
g 
th
e 
la
nd
 st
ro
ng
ly
 d
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
pu
m
pi
ng
 g
ro
un
d 
w
at
er
.
 
A
s s
uc
h,
 th
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
w
at
er
 is
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 to
 b
e 
ve
ry
 h
ig
h 
by
 m
an
y 
liv
es
to
ck
 fa
rm
er
s. 
W
at
er
 is
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 to
 b
e 
th
e 
m
or
e 
va
lu
ab
le
 th
e 
sc
ar
ce
r i
t i
s. 
O
ne
 b
or
eh
ol
e 
on
 
o
u
r 
sa
m
pl
e 
fa
rm
s h
ad
 to
 se
rv
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
37
5 
an
d 
43
00
 h
a o
f f
ar
m
la
nd
. I
t c
an
 b
e a
ss
um
ed
 th
at
, f
or
 
a 
pa
rti
cu
la
r a
re
a,
 th
e 
va
lu
e 
of
 w
at
er
 a
nd
, c
on
se
qu
en
tly
,
 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 is
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 to
 b
e 
hi
gh
er
 th
e 
lo
w
er
 th
e 
bo
re
ho
le
 d
en
sit
y.
In
 o
ur
 ro
le
-p
la
ys
 th
e 
bo
re
ho
le
 d
en
sit
y 
an
d,
 
th
er
ef
or
e,
 th
e 
w
at
er
 sc
ar
ci
ty
 d
id
 n
ot
 v
ar
y. 
W
e 
di
d 
no
t w
an
t t
o 
ad
d 
an
ot
he
r a
sp
ec
t o
f 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 to
 th
e 
ga
m
e.
 H
ow
ev
er
,
 
in
 o
ur
 
an
al
ys
is 
w
e 
co
nt
ro
l f
or
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
re
al
 
lif
e 
bo
re
ho
le
 d
en
sit
y 
ha
s a
n 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
 fa
rm
er
s’ 
co
n
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 to
 th
e 
w
at
er
 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
.
Ta
bl
e A
1.
2:
 
(co
nit
nu
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)
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Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s i
n 
th
e 
N
am
ib
ia
n 
la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 c
on
te
xt
Co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
in
 o
ur
 a
na
ly
sis
 o
f l
an
d 
re
fo
rm
 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s’ 
joi
nt 
pro
vis
ion
 of
 w
ate
r
R
U
5 
– 
N
um
be
r o
f 
u
n
its
W
e 
do
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
da
ta
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
on
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f w
at
er
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
in
 a
qu
ife
rs
 n
or
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 
ex
tr
ac
te
d 
fro
m
 th
em
.
Fa
rm
 c
lu
ste
rs
 in
 o
ur
 sa
m
pl
e 
us
e 
joi
ntl
y o
ne
 to
 fo
ur 
pu
mp
s.
D
ue
 to
 p
oo
r d
at
a 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y, 
w
e 
co
u
ld
 n
ot
 
in
cl
ud
e 
th
is 
as
pe
ct
 in
 o
ur
 a
na
ly
sis
.
R
U
6 
– 
D
ist
in
ct
iv
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
In
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 se
ns
e,
 d
ist
in
ct
iv
e 
m
ar
ki
ng
s d
o 
no
t m
at
te
r i
n 
ou
r c
as
e 
as
 th
e 
re
so
ur
ce
 u
ni
ts 
ca
n 
be
 
co
n
sid
er
ed
 to
 b
e 
im
m
ob
ile
.
Th
e 
w
at
er
 q
ua
lit
y 
va
rie
s b
et
w
ee
n 
di
ffe
re
nt
 b
or
eh
ol
es
, i
n 
pa
rti
cu
la
r, 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 th
e 
co
nt
en
t 
o
f m
in
er
al
s. 
Th
e 
sa
lin
ity
 o
f w
at
er
 is
, h
ow
ev
er
,
 
m
ai
nl
y 
re
le
va
nt
 fo
r t
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
he
 w
at
er
 fo
r 
hu
m
an
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n.
D
ist
in
ct
iv
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s o
f r
es
ou
rc
e 
un
its
 
ar
e 
n
o
t r
el
ev
an
t i
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ex
t o
f o
ur
 st
ud
y.
R
U
7 
– 
Sp
at
ia
l a
nd
 
te
m
po
ra
l d
ist
rib
ut
io
n
A
s m
en
tio
ne
d 
be
fo
re
, t
he
 d
en
sit
y 
of
 b
or
eh
ol
es
 st
ro
ng
ly
 v
ar
ie
s b
et
w
ee
n 
ou
r s
am
pl
e 
fa
rm
s 
(be
tw
ee
n 3
75
 an
d 4
30
0 h
a p
er 
bo
reh
ole
).
Th
er
e 
is 
no
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 te
m
po
ra
l v
ar
ia
tio
n 
in
 w
at
er
 a
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
sin
ce
 th
e 
w
at
er
 is
 p
um
pe
d 
fro
m
 
aq
ui
fe
rs
.
N
ei
th
er
 te
m
po
ra
l n
or
 sp
at
ia
l d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
ef
fe
ct
s o
f w
at
er
 a
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
fe
at
ur
es
 in
 o
ur
 ro
le
-p
la
y.
 
H
ow
ev
er
,
 
du
rin
g 
o
u
r 
da
ta
 a
na
ly
sis
 w
e 
co
nt
ro
l f
or
 th
e 
bo
re
ho
le
 
de
ns
ity
.
G
ov
er
na
nc
e 
Sy
ste
m
 (G
S)
G
S1
 –
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
Th
e 
m
os
t i
m
po
rta
nt
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
FU
RS
 in
str
um
en
t o
f 
th
e 
N
am
ib
ia
n 
la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 a
re
 th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
 o
f L
an
ds
 a
nd
 R
es
et
tle
m
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
 
o
f A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
, W
at
er
 a
nd
 F
or
es
try
.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
so
m
e 
un
cl
ea
r r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
tie
s b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
tw
o 
m
in
ist
rie
s. 
In
 g
en
er
al
, t
he
 M
in
ist
ry
 o
f L
an
ds
 is
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r p
re
pa
rin
g 
fa
rm
s f
or
 
re
di
str
ib
ut
io
n.
 T
hi
s i
nc
lu
de
s a
 fu
ll 
re
pa
ir 
of
 a
ll 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
s. 
A
t t
he
 sa
m
e 
tim
e 
th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
 o
f 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 is
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r r
ur
al
 w
at
er
 su
pp
ly
.
 
A
s a
 re
su
lt 
of
 th
is 
un
cl
ea
r s
itu
at
io
n,
 th
e 
re
pa
ir 
o
f i
nf
ra
str
uc
tu
re
 is
 d
el
ay
ed
. T
hi
s n
ot
 o
nl
y 
de
te
rio
ra
te
s t
he
 w
at
er
 su
pp
ly
.
 
Si
nc
e 
th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
 o
f 
La
nd
s c
an
 o
nl
y 
sig
n 
le
as
eh
ol
d 
ag
re
em
en
ts 
w
ith
 th
e 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s, 
th
is 
sit
ua
tio
n 
al
so
 le
ad
s t
o 
in
se
cu
re
 p
ro
pe
rty
 ri
gh
ts 
fo
r s
om
e 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s (
see
 G
S4
).
Th
re
e 
is 
no
 v
ar
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
in
 o
ur
 sa
m
pl
e 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f d
iff
er
en
t g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
. A
s s
uc
h,
 w
e 
ca
nn
ot
 m
ak
e 
st
at
em
en
ts
 a
bo
ut
 th
ei
r i
nfl
ue
nc
e 
on
 th
e 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s’ 
co
o
pe
ra
tio
n.
Ta
bl
e A
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)
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Sy
ste
m
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s i
n 
th
e 
N
am
ib
ia
n 
la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 c
on
te
xt
Co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
in
 o
ur
 a
na
ly
sis
 o
f l
an
d 
re
fo
rm
 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s’ 
joi
nt 
pro
vis
ion
 of
 w
ate
r
G
S2
 –
 N
on
-
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 
(N
GO
s)
Th
er
e 
is 
str
on
g 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l d
on
or
 su
pp
or
t f
or
 N
am
ib
ia
’s 
la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 p
ro
gr
am
. F
ur
th
er
m
or
e,
 
fa
rm
er
s a
re
 o
rg
an
iz
ed
 in
to
 u
ni
on
s w
ith
 th
e 
N
am
ib
ia
 A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l U
ni
on
 (N
AU
) m
ain
ly 
re
pr
es
en
tin
g 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 fa
rm
er
s, 
an
d 
th
e 
N
am
ib
ia
 E
m
er
gi
ng
 C
om
m
er
ci
al
 
Fa
rm
er
s’ 
Fo
ru
m
 (N
EC
FF
) a
dd
res
ses
 th
e n
ee
ds
 of
 la
nd
 re
for
m 
be
ne
fic
iar
ies
. T
he
 u
ni
on
s e
ng
ag
e 
in
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 c
ap
ac
ity
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
lo
bb
yi
ng
 a
nd
 re
se
ar
ch
, a
nd
 su
pp
or
t v
ar
io
us
 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ac
tiv
iti
es
.
A
t t
he
 ti
m
e 
of
 th
e 
stu
dy
,
 
fa
rm
er
s u
ni
on
s h
os
te
d 
th
e 
Em
er
gi
ng
 F
ar
m
er
s’ 
Su
pp
or
t P
ro
gr
am
m
e 
(E
FS
P)
, w
hic
h w
as 
fin
an
ce
d b
y E
U 
an
d G
erm
an
 de
ve
lop
me
nt 
aid
. T
he
 E
FS
P 
fo
cu
se
d 
str
on
gl
y 
o
n
 v
ar
io
us
 a
sp
ec
ts 
of
 c
ap
ac
ity
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t.
La
nd
 re
fo
rm
 b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s h
av
e 
eq
ua
l 
o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s t
o 
ga
in
 fr
om
 th
e 
su
pp
or
t 
o
f N
G
O
s a
nd
 fa
rm
er
s u
ni
on
s i
n 
te
rm
s o
f 
lo
bb
yi
ng
 a
nd
 m
ar
ke
tin
g.
 H
ow
 fa
r t
he
se
 
su
pp
or
t a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
ffe
ct
 c
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e 
be
ha
vi
ou
r c
an
, t
he
re
fo
re
, n
ot
 b
e 
as
se
ss
ed
 
w
ith
in
 o
ur
 sa
m
pl
e.
W
e 
in
cl
ud
e,
 h
ow
ev
er
,
 
th
e 
w
ee
ks
 o
f f
ar
m
in
g 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 a
s a
 p
ro
xy
 fo
r c
ap
ac
ity
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 o
f v
ar
io
us
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
.
G
S3
 –
 N
et
w
or
k 
st
ru
ct
ur
e
FU
RS
 la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s a
re
 fo
rc
ed
, b
y 
th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
 o
f L
an
ds
, i
nt
o 
a 
sit
ua
tio
n 
w
he
re
 
th
ey
 m
us
t c
oo
pe
ra
te
 w
ith
 p
eo
pl
e 
th
ey
 d
id
 n
ot
 k
no
w
 b
ef
or
e.
 T
he
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t b
uy
s f
ar
m
s o
n 
th
e 
la
nd
 m
ar
ke
t, 
sp
lit
s t
he
m
 in
to
 sm
al
le
r u
ni
ts 
an
d 
al
lo
ca
te
s t
he
m
 to
 a
pp
lic
an
ts.
 A
s a
 re
su
lt,
 
th
e 
fa
rm
 u
ni
ts 
do
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
ex
cl
us
iv
e 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
; t
hu
s t
he
 b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s h
av
e 
to
 sh
ar
e 
th
e 
fo
rm
er
ly
 c
en
tra
lly
-m
an
ag
ed
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
. T
he
 sh
ar
in
g 
of
 w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 is
 e
ve
n 
em
ph
as
iz
ed
 in
 th
e 
le
as
e 
ag
re
em
en
t. 
Pe
op
le
 fr
om
 d
iff
er
en
t p
ar
ts 
of
 th
e 
co
un
try
 w
ith
 d
iff
er
en
t 
et
hn
ic
 o
rig
in
s m
us
t fi
nd
 a
 w
ay
 to
 jo
int
ly 
ma
na
ge
 th
e i
nfr
ast
ruc
tur
e. 
In 
thi
s w
ay
 ne
w 
im
po
rta
nt 
n
et
w
or
ks
 re
la
te
d 
to
 w
at
er
 su
pp
ly
 a
re
 c
re
at
ed
.
Th
e 
fo
cu
s o
f o
ur
 re
se
ar
ch
 is
 to
 u
nd
er
sta
nd
 
ho
w
 lo
ca
l l
an
d 
re
fo
rm
 b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s 
co
o
pe
ra
te
 in
 th
e 
pr
ov
isi
on
 o
f w
at
er
.
 
W
e 
as
se
ss
 th
e 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
be
ha
vi
ou
r u
sin
g 
a 
sim
ul
at
io
n-
m
od
el
 b
as
ed
 ro
le
-p
la
y.
G
S4
 –
 P
ro
pe
rty
 ri
gh
ts 
sy
ste
m
s
FU
RS
 fa
rm
s a
re
 o
w
ne
d 
by
 th
e s
tat
e. 
Fa
rm
er
s a
re
 su
pp
os
ed
 to
 re
ce
iv
e l
on
g-
ter
m
 le
as
eh
ol
d 
tit
les
 
w
hi
ch
 g
iv
e b
en
efi
cia
rie
s –
 in
 th
e w
or
ds
 o
f S
ch
lag
er
 an
d 
O
str
om
 (1
99
2) 
– i
nd
ivi
du
al 
rig
hts
 of
 
ac
ce
ss
, w
ith
dr
aw
al,
 an
d 
ex
clu
sio
n.
 G
en
er
all
y, 
fa
rm
er
s a
lso
 h
av
e t
he
 ri
gh
t t
o 
m
an
ag
e, 
bu
t t
he
 le
as
in
g 
ag
re
em
en
ts 
in
cl
ud
e v
ar
io
us
 la
nd
 u
se
 re
str
ict
io
ns
. A
lie
na
tio
n 
rig
ht
s a
re
 ex
cl
us
iv
el
y 
ke
pt
 b
y 
th
e s
tat
e. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, n
ati
on
al 
law
s a
nd
 p
ol
ici
es
 p
lac
e s
om
e r
es
tri
cti
on
s o
n 
th
e r
ig
ht
s t
o 
m
an
ag
e t
he
 la
nd
.
In
 2
00
8,
 3
9%
 o
f o
ur
 sa
m
pl
e h
el
d 
no
 le
as
eh
ol
d 
ag
re
em
en
t a
nd
, t
he
re
fo
re
, n
o 
w
rit
te
n 
pr
oo
f o
f t
he
ir 
rig
ht
s t
o 
th
e 
al
lo
tte
d 
la
nd
. T
he
 M
in
ist
ry
 o
f L
an
ds
 an
d 
Re
se
ttl
em
en
t d
el
ay
ed
 si
gn
in
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
s 
(F
alk
 et
 
al
. 2
01
0;
 W
er
n
er
 a
n
d 
O
de
nd
aa
l 2
01
0).
 Fo
r a
 de
scr
ipt
ion
 of
 on
e r
ea
so
n p
lea
se 
see
 G
S1
.
In
se
cu
re
 p
ro
pe
rty
 ri
gh
ts 
ar
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 a
ffe
ct
 th
e 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s o
f l
an
d 
re
fo
rm
 b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s t
o 
in
ve
st 
in
 w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
.
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
no
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s r
eg
ar
di
ng
 th
e 
pr
op
er
ty
 ri
gh
ts 
of
 th
e 
pl
ay
er
s i
n 
ou
r g
am
es
. 
H
ow
ev
er
,
 
in
 o
ur
 a
na
ly
sis
 w
e 
co
nt
ro
l f
or
 
w
he
th
er
 fa
rm
er
s w
ho
 h
av
e 
sig
ne
d 
a 
le
as
eh
ol
d 
ag
re
em
en
t a
re
 w
ill
in
g 
to
 m
ak
e 
hi
gh
er
 
co
n
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 to
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 
in
 th
e 
ga
m
e.
Ta
bl
e A
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2:
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Sy
ste
m
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
s i
n 
th
e 
N
am
ib
ia
n 
la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 c
on
te
xt
Co
ns
id
er
at
io
n 
in
 o
ur
 a
na
ly
sis
 o
f l
an
d 
re
fo
rm
 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s’ 
joi
nt 
pro
vis
ion
 of
 w
ate
r
G
S5
 –
 O
pe
ra
tio
na
l-
ch
oi
ce
 ru
le
s
Fo
r t
he
 m
os
t p
ar
t, 
FU
RS
 fa
rm
er
s c
an
 m
ak
e 
th
ei
r o
w
n 
de
ci
sio
ns
 a
bo
ut
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l r
ul
es
. T
he
y 
ar
e 
re
st
ric
te
d 
on
ly
 b
y 
na
tio
na
l p
ol
ic
ie
s a
nd
 la
w
s, 
e.
g.
 th
e 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l M
an
ag
em
en
t A
ct
, 2
00
7 
(N
o. 
7 o
f 2
00
7) 
an
d t
he
 W
at
er
 R
es
ou
rc
es
 M
an
ag
em
en
t A
ct
, 2
00
4 
(N
o. 
24
 of
 20
04
). I
n a
dd
itio
n 
to
 n
at
io
na
l p
ol
ic
ie
s a
nd
 la
w
s, 
th
ei
r l
ea
sin
g 
ag
re
em
en
ts 
re
str
ic
t t
he
ir 
la
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t d
ec
isi
on
s 
to
 a
 la
rg
e 
de
gr
ee
.
Th
e 
le
as
e 
ag
re
em
en
t s
pe
ci
fie
s t
ha
t t
he
 la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s o
f a
 fa
rm
 c
lu
ste
r a
re
 
su
pp
os
ed
 to
 sh
ar
e 
th
e 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
. I
t f
ur
th
er
 sp
ec
ifi
es
 th
at
 th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
 o
f L
an
ds
 
is 
sti
ll 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r t
he
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
. A
t t
he
 sa
m
e 
tim
e,
 la
nd
 re
fo
rm
 
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s a
re
 o
bl
ig
ed
 to
 k
ee
p 
th
e 
w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
sta
te
 a
s i
t w
as
 w
he
n 
th
e 
fa
rm
 w
as
 h
an
de
d 
ov
er
.
 
Ta
ki
ng
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 th
at
 le
as
e 
ag
re
em
en
ts 
ar
e 
sig
ne
d 
fo
r a
 9
9 
ye
ar
 
pe
rio
d,
 th
is 
ra
ise
s q
ue
sti
on
s a
bo
ut
 w
ho
 is
 re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r t
he
 g
en
er
al
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
.
In
 re
al
ity
,
 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t i
s e
xt
re
m
el
y 
slo
w
 in
 re
sp
on
di
ng
 to
 re
qu
es
ts 
to
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
w
at
er
 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
. I
f f
ar
m
er
s d
o 
no
t w
an
t t
o 
ris
k 
lo
sin
g 
th
ei
r h
er
d 
in
 c
as
e 
of
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 
br
ea
kd
ow
ns
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
to
 re
pa
ir 
it 
th
em
se
lv
es
. O
pe
ra
tio
na
l r
ul
es
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
of
 a
 fa
rm
 
cl
us
te
r a
re
 to
 b
e 
ag
re
ed
 u
po
n 
by
 th
e 
fa
rm
er
s o
nl
y.
In
 o
ur
 re
se
ar
ch
 re
gi
on
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
tw
o 
ty
pi
ca
l o
pe
ra
tio
na
l r
ul
es
 w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 c
on
tri
bu
tio
ns
 to
 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
. E
ith
er
 fa
rm
er
s p
ay
 a
n 
eq
ua
l fi
xe
d 
am
ou
nt
 o
r t
he
y 
ca
lc
ul
at
e 
a 
fe
e 
pe
r h
ea
d 
of
 li
ve
sto
ck
. W
e 
as
so
ci
at
e 
th
e 
fir
st 
ru
le
 w
ith
 a
 c
on
di
tio
na
l c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
pa
tte
rn
, w
hi
le
 
th
e 
se
co
nd
 ru
le
 a
ch
ie
ve
s c
on
gr
ue
nc
e 
of
 p
ro
vi
sio
n 
an
d 
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n.
 T
he
 ru
le
 o
f c
on
gr
ue
nc
e 
of
 
pr
ov
isi
on
 a
nd
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
tio
n 
is 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 to
 b
e 
m
or
e 
fa
ir 
an
d 
su
sta
in
ab
le
 a
nd
 is
 a
lso
 p
ro
m
ot
ed
 
by
 th
e 
M
in
ist
ry
 o
f A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
.
La
nd
 re
fo
rm
 b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s n
ee
d 
to
 o
bt
ai
n 
th
e 
m
in
ist
ry
’s 
pe
rm
iss
io
n 
fo
r a
ny
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts.
 T
he
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t i
s r
el
uc
ta
nt
 to
 g
iv
e 
th
is 
pe
rm
iss
io
n 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
to
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
e 
th
e 
fa
rm
er
 fo
r a
ny
 im
pr
ov
em
en
ts 
on
ce
 th
e 
ag
re
em
en
t e
xp
ire
s o
r i
s t
er
m
in
at
ed
. 
O
ur
 ro
le
-p
la
ys
 si
m
ul
at
e 
th
e 
sit
ua
tio
n 
w
he
re
 
gr
ou
ps
 n
ee
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 to
 th
e 
w
at
er
-
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
. W
e 
pl
ay
 
w
ith
 g
ro
up
s o
f p
la
ye
rs
 w
ho
 a
lso
, i
n 
re
al
-li
fe
, 
ha
ve
 to
 m
an
ag
e 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 to
ge
th
er
.
 
A
n 
im
po
rta
nt
 fe
at
ur
e 
of
 th
e 
ga
m
e 
is 
th
at
 w
e 
al
so
 
sim
ul
at
e 
ec
ol
og
ic
al
 a
nd
 h
er
d 
dy
na
m
ic
s. 
A
s 
in
 re
al
 li
fe
, t
hi
s c
re
at
es
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
co
st
s 
fo
r f
ar
m
er
s w
ho
 c
ho
os
e 
a 
ru
le
 o
f 
co
n
gr
ue
nc
e 
of
 p
ro
vi
sio
n 
an
d 
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n.
It 
is 
im
po
rta
nt
 to
 n
ot
e 
th
at
 w
e 
do
 n
ot
 
co
n
sid
er
 o
ur
 re
se
ar
ch
 a
s o
nl
y 
a 
stu
dy
 o
f 
gr
ou
p 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
in
 w
at
er
 in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
. T
he
 ro
le
-p
la
ys
 h
av
e 
a 
hi
gh
 
de
gr
ee
 o
f e
xt
er
na
l v
al
id
ity
 a
nd
 c
an
 th
er
ef
or
e 
en
co
u
ra
ge
 th
e 
ne
go
tia
tio
n 
of
 n
ew
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l 
ru
le
s. 
Th
is 
is 
m
or
e 
im
po
rta
nt
 a
s t
he
 g
ro
up
s 
do
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
a 
hi
sto
ry
 o
f c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
ca
n
n
o
t r
el
y 
on
 g
ro
w
n 
in
sti
tu
tio
ns
.
G
S6
 –
 C
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ch
oi
ce
 ru
le
s
Li
ttl
e 
is 
kn
ow
n 
ab
ou
t c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ch
oi
ce
 ru
le
s o
f l
an
d 
re
fo
rm
 b
en
efi
ci
ar
ie
s s
ha
rin
g 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
at
er
 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
 o
n 
a 
fa
rm
 u
ni
t c
lu
ste
r. 
Th
ey
 h
av
e 
to
 a
gr
ee
 o
n 
ne
w
 c
ol
le
ct
iv
e 
ch
oi
ce
 ru
le
s w
ith
ou
t 
a 
hi
sto
ry
 o
f c
oo
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APPENDIX 2: Theoretical Considerations on Water Provision 
in the FURS Setting
In the following section we present some theoretical considerations related to 
the challenge of water provision cooperation in Central Namibia. The payment 
systems most commonly used by the farmers are either payment per farmer or per 
head of livestock. Our model aims at drawing theoretical hypotheses regarding 
farmers’ contributions and free ride incentives in the management of water 
infrastructure.
In real life, the maintenance costs of water pumps vary from year to year and are 
unknown to the farmers. The aquifer water is not scarce and the farmers do not face 
strong rivalry in water consumption. Despite the uncertainty of the maintenance 
costs, the farmers always have a watering opportunity for their herd. They can 
use their own water infrastructure, as long as their own pump is operational, or 
they use alternative water sources, e.g. on neighbouring farms. Therefore, actions 
and processes which change livestock numbers are neglected in our theoretical 
analysis. In addition, we neglect any other costs such as production costs.
Consider a group of N farmers collectively using the same water infrastructure 
whose maintenance costs need to be covered by the farmers. Each farmer i 
has to contribute an amount Ci, i∈{1, …, N} into the water fund WFt to cover 
the maintenance costs K of the infrastructure. At the end of each period, 
after subtracting the maintenance costs K, the amount remaining in the water fund 
WF
t-1 is transferred to the next period which represents the connection between 
two rounds. The model neglects time preferences and interest rates. After the 
farmers have paid their contribution into the water fund WF
t
, its value is given 
with:
−
=
= + ∑1
1
.
N
t t i
i
WF WF C
The maintenance costs K are uncertain and represent a continuous uniform 
distribution along the interval [0, V], with V being the value of building a new 
water infrastructure. The functioning probability of the water infrastructure 
depends on the probability that the amount in the water fund is higher than the 
maintenance costs:
≤ =( ) .tt
WFP K WF
V
If the amount in the water fund WF
t
 does not cover the maintenance costs K, the 
infrastructure breaks down. In this case each farmer usually takes her cattle to the 
neighbouring farm where she has to pay fees per head of cattle, which we label 
here OC (opportunity costs). This alternative water source has a direct influence 
on the farmers’ incentive to participate in the maintenance or their own water 
infrastructure. From an opportunity costs perspective, each farmer would choose 
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to use the water source which is less costly for her. From these considerations 
comes the following:
Proposition 1: a group or a farmer will contribute for the maintenance of their 
water infrastructure, if the group or the individual participation condition is 
fulfilled.
At the group level, the total opportunity costs OCN of all group members must be 
higher than their total contribution CN into the water fund for each period:
with
= =
≤ = ⋅ =∑ ∑
1 1
,   and  .
N N
N N N i N i
i i
C OC OC OC X C C
OC represents the opportunity costs per head of livestock and Xi the total number 
of livestock owned by farmer i. The fulfilment of this group participation condition 
does not automatically imply the fulfilment of the individual participation 
condition. At the individual level the opportunity costs OCi of a farmer i must be 
higher than her contribution Ci into the water fund:
= ⋅<
,
,  with .i i iiC O OC OC XC
Considering her individual opportunity costs OCi, the contribution of other farmers 
and the uncertain maintenance costs K, each farmer i chooses the contribution Ci 
that minimizes her expected costs EC(Ci):
 
= ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅  min  ( ) 1i t ti i iC
WF WF
EC C C OC X
V V
−
=
= + ∑1
1
. . .
N
t t i
i
s t WF WF C
Due to the uncertain maintenance costs it is difficult for the farmer to use backward 
induction to consider her future contributions when computing her optimization 
problem in period t. Therefore, the farmer will solve her problem as a one shot 
game in each period. The optimal contribution of farmer i resulting from this 
decision situation is −
−
= ≠
⋅ − −
=
∑11
1, 
.
2
N
i t j
j i j
i
OC X WF C
C
On the basis of the model, we can draw conclusions about the theoretical reaction 
of one farmer to the payments of other farmers. In equilibrium the strategic 
reaction of farmer i to the contribution of the other farmers in her cluster is to 
reduce her contribution. On the strength of this conclusion we establish our next 
proposition:
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Proposition 2: Farmer i’s contribution is negatively correlated with the 
contribution of other farmers in her group:
∂
<∂ 0
i
j
C
C
When a short-sighted strategic farmer i computes her optimal decision, neglecting 
future interaction and not holding other-regarding preferences, she takes the 
contribution of other farmers as given. Any additional payment of farmer i will 
increase the survival rate of the water infrastructure which is beneficial to all 
farmers in the cluster. If farmer j raises her contribution, farmer i will strategically 
reduce her contribution to the group water fund. This behaviour conflicts with the 
inequity aversion concept of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and conditional cooperation 
of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010).
Another important aspect for the decision making is the fact that a farmer’s 
opportunity costs are determined by her number of livestock. Independent 
of fairness norms, she is willing to increase payments if her opportunity costs 
increase. She strives to avoid higher opportunity costs if the infrastructure breaks 
down; thus, she has an incentive to contribute. The congruence of appropriation 
(livestock number) and provision (individual contribution) can be observed in this 
result (Ostrom 2010). A farmer with a large number of livestock will pay more 
than a farmer with a small number of livestock. From this we derive the following:
Proposition 3: The larger the number of livestock of a farmer, the greater her 
contribution into the water fund:
∂
>∂ 0.
i
i
C
OC
As mentioned before, farmers can either pay an equal fixed amount or they can 
choose to calculate a fee per head of livestock. If herd endowment is relatively 
homogenous across farmers, then the individual payments will be similar under 
both payment rules. The amounts differ, however, in groups with heterogeneous 
livestock endowments. From this we establish the following:
Proposition 4: The payment system with equal contribution per farmer i is 
stable in groups with homogeneous endowments. It is less stable in groups with 
heterogeneous endowments:
= = if  .i j i jC C X X
Propositions 2 and 3 predict that poorer farmers, in terms of livestock, will 
expect wealthier farmers to contribute more to the water fund. An equal payment 
would deviate from the optimal reaction function, thus, from the equilibrium, 
when livestock numbers are unequal. From Propositions 2, 3 and 4 it follows that 
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heterogeneous groups, in terms of livestock endowment, are, in equilibrium, more 
likely to choose the rule payment per head of livestock.
The explorative SES assessment made us aware that water provision 
cooperation by Namibian land reform beneficiaries has to be achieved in systems 
of high dynamic complexity. Amongst others, these are marked by permanent 
and often delayed changes, multiple feedbacks at different speeds, nonlinear 
relationships of variables, and often irreversible developments (Sterman 2001, 
2006; Barreteau et al. 2001). The systems are reflexive, acting on decision makers 
who, through their actions, affect various components of the system (Bousquet 
et al. 2002). More specifically, we learned from the explorative SES assessment 
that complex system interactions create strong dynamics of total and relative 
livestock numbers. In summary, we expect that a payment system which is 
linked to livestock numbers and achieves stronger congruence of provision and 
appropriation is more stable in maintaining group cooperation.
Acknowledging the complexity of social ecological systems initiated the 
debate on how to decide which variables should be included in particular studies. 
Catalogues of third tier SES framework variables collected from various studies 
quickly contain hundreds of variables. There is a common understanding that 
only such variables should be selected which are relevant for a particular study. 
The explorative SES assessment helped us to identify relevant control variables. 
Without formalising we had implicitly theories in mind when selecting the controls. 
Especially for the quantitative analysis another criteria has been important. We 
included only such variables in our analyses which show a considerable variance 
across our sample. With our study design we cannot make any statements about 
the importance of features of the SES which are identical across our sample. 
Such variables can still have a strong impact on cooperation patterns. Good 
examples are historical or political factors. We provide in the introduction and in 
Appendix 1 some context information on such variables. This has implications on 
the interpretation of our results. Our models explain cooperation behaviour given 
that our sample has been exposed to the same history and policies.
APPENDIX 3: The ecological-economic model
This Appendix describes the combined ecological-economic model that has been 
used for the role-plays. The descriptions already include all adaptations that 
are needed for the interactive application. A detailed formal description of the 
applied sub-models can be found in Tietjen et al. (2009), Tietjen et al. (2010), and 
Lohmann et al. (2012). The model described here is also published in Lohmann 
et al. (2014).
We use a combined ecological-economic model to simulate rangeland 
management during the role-plays. A farm sub-model simulates animal herd 
dynamics, different fixed and variable costs and allows for interactive trading of 
livestock. A vegetation sub-model simulates the dynamics of a semi-arid savannah 
based on a state-and-transition approach (Westoby et al. 1989).
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In the following, we first describe how we generated the transition probabilities 
for the vegetation- sub-model by means of simulations with the established high-
resolution eco-hydrological model EcoHyd (Tietjen et al. 2010; Lohmann et al. 
2012). Further, we describe in detail the structure and rules of the interactive farm-
scale ecological-economic model that we used for the interactive and simulation-
based experiments in the field.
Vegetation dynamics Landscape scale vegetation dynamics were simulated 
using the state-and-transition approach (Westoby et al. 1989; e.g. Popp et al. 
2009). The underlying transition probabilities were derived from vegetation 
dynamics simulated with the eco-hydrological model EcoHyd (Tietjen et al. 
2010). Following the idea of the state-and-transition concept, we first defined 
ecological states between which the semi-arid savannah can switch, and then we 
identified probabilities for the transition between these states.
The definition of the vegetation states was exclusively based on perennial 
grass and not, for several reasons, on woody vegetation cover or annual grasses. 
First, perennial grasses are the vegetation type providing the desired fodder 
biomass for livestock and, are thus, most important from a land user perspective. 
Second, perennial grasses respond quickly to changes in seasonal precipitation 
and livestock densities, while woody vegetation responds on the scale of decades 
(see Lohmann et al. 2012) and annuals respond directly to the presence or absence 
of the two other types (e.g. Lohmann et al. 2012). Consequently, as we want 
to simulate only 10 years of land use in the role-plays, an inclusion of woody 
vegetation is not necessary. Further, a simple description of the ecological states is 
important for a clear communication of the model’s state to the participants during 
the role-plays. We defined four vegetation states and five classes of precipitation 
that are given in Table A3.1.
We conducted 100 repeated simulations of 100 years for each of 13 different 
grazing intensities (2–26 ha LSU–1). Every single simulation had a unique 
stochastic time series of precipitation (see Tietjen et al. 2010; Lohmann et al. 
2012). In every time step, the change of the average cover of perennial grasses 
(on the simulated 2.25 ha grid), the respective seasonal amount of precipitation 
and the biomass of annual and perennial grasses was recorded. This resulted 
in 65 transition probability matrices (for 13 different grazing intensities and 
5 classes of seasonal rainfall intensity) and 4 regressions (one per vegetation 
state) for both annual and perennial grass biomass production as a function of 
rainfall.
Table A3.1: Definition of vegetation states.
Perennial grass cover (%) Vegetation state
>40 0 (very good)
20–40 1 (good)
10–20 2 (moderate)
<10 3 (bad)
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Finally, vegetation dynamics and biomass production are stochastically 
simulated with the state-and-transition approach for a grid of variable size 
(depending on the interactive initialization at the beginning of the role-play) with 
a cell size of 1 ha in annual time steps.
Farm model
In the following we describe the processes accordingly. All model rules have been 
discussed, in several feedback sessions and model test runs, with members of 
the Namibian Emerging Commercial Farmers Support Programme (ECFSP) and 
rangeland experts from the MAWF research station at Sandveld. Rules are based 
on the recommendations of the joint presidency committee (JPC) of the Namibia 
National Farmers Union (NNFU) and the Namibia Agricultural Union (NAU) 
who developed management guidelines for the ECFSP (Stehn 2008a,b).
The model implementation allows for interactive decisions regarding 
cooperation in water-infrastructure maintenance between several farmers. During 
the role-plays participants were also able to contribute to group water funds.
Initialisation
At the beginning of every role-play, a few parameters and the state variables of 
the model need to be initialized. Therefore, every player needs to input the type of 
farm with regard to the land reform measure, the size of the farm, the number of 
animals kept, the number and type of water pumps run on the farm, the number of 
farm workers employed and the salary paid for them. After the input of this basic 
information, the composition of the cattle herd and the state of the vegetation 
(see Table A3.1) are initialized. We assumed a moderate to good condition of 
the on-farm vegetation and randomly set the vegetation state in each cell to state 
1 or 2 with equal probability. The animal herd was composed assuming good 
management. This resulted in a herd of mainly young animals in good condition 
(see initial age class distribution in Table A3.2). Further we assumed the herd to 
consist of mainly fertile adults (56% cows and 4% bulls), 10% oxen, 10% heifers 
and 20% weaned calves (weaners). This composition represents a fertile breeding 
herd and allows for a quick adaptation of the management to either a cow/oxen- or 
weaner-production strategy.
Biomass Production
Based on the current vegetation state and the rainfall of the current season, the 
model calculates the biomass production of perennial and annual grasses for all cells 
according to the linear relation derived in the up scaling process.
Number of bulls
In order to reduce the complexity of the role-plays, the number of bulls is 
automatically adapted on an annual basis assuming that at least 1 bull is always 
available per 25 cows (as recommended in Stehn 2008a). Bulls are taken from 
male weaned calves (weaners).
Congruence of appropriation and provision in collective water provision 115
Animal condition score and starvation
We categorized the animals’ condition from “very lean” to “fat” according to a 
scoring system that was developed by the Emerging Commercial Farmers Support 
Program of Namibia (ECFSP). The score of an animal relates to its nutritional 
condition and more specifically to its body mass (Table A3.3).
Condition of animals was calculated for an “average individual” based on the 
number of large stock units (LSU), and the available fodder on a farm irrespective 
of the current composition of the herd. From here we calculate an average daily 
weight gain for the three periods of the year that are given by the model structure 
(see Figure 2 in main text) since animal numbers and, thus, fodder availability 
might change during the course of the year. Animals feed with a daily intake 
rate (rin) of up to 5% (rin,max) of their body mass depending on fodder availability 
(Tainton 1999). Hereby we assume the intake rate rin during the respective part 
of the year (with dy days) to be as high as possible according to the available 
grass biomass gb
avail (biomass produced minus biomass that was already eaten). 
Accordingly, the maximum value of rin<rin,max is chosen so that
≥ × × × + × × × 0.01 ,
avail y in LSU LSU left LSU LSUgb d r w N d w N  (Eq. A3.1)
where wLSU is the mean weight per LSU (450 kg) and NLSU the current number of 
animals in LSU. For example, during the first 120 days of a year (late rainy season 
from January to April) the animals will feed with a rate of rin if biomass availability 
enables at least a rate of 1% of their body mass for the rest of the year (245 days 
Table A3.2: Age class definition and age dependent parameter values.
Age class Age [years] Cows [%] in initial herd Oxen [%] in initial herd Price coefficient
1 3–5 25 20 1.0
2 6 20 20 0.95
3 7 15 20 0.8
4 8 15 20 0.7
5 9 10 20 0.6
6 10 8 0 0.4
7 11 5 0 0.4
8 12 2 0 0.4
Table A3.3: Definition of condition score of animals.
Condition score Body mass [kg]
0 <270
1 270–320
2 320–380
3 380–440
4 >440
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from May to December). By this, we achieve the typical seasonal changes in body 
mass that the animals undergo (Tainton 1999) and simulate body score dynamics 
that are part of the output that is given to the farmers during the role-play.
After the intake rate was determined according to eqn. 1, the daily weight gain 
of the animals and, thus, the current average condition score of an individual can 
be calculated. If the daily intake rate (rin) lies above the minimum daily intake that 
enables weight gain (rin,lim) the daily weight gain is
= − − −
, , ,
Dailygain (( ) / ( )) * * * ( ) / ,in in lim in max in lim max maxr r r r gr bm bm bm bm  (Eq. A3.2)
where bm is the biomass of an average animal, gr the potential growth rate of an 
animal and bm
max
, the maximum body mass of an animal.
For rates below rin,lim, animals start losing weight according to a linear relation 
leading to a daily weight loss of max 0.2 kg per day if the available fodder biomass 
only allows for an intake rate of 1% or less.
Animals are assumed to starve whenever the average body mass is <220 kg. 
In times of very scarce fodder resources, the model will reduce animal numbers 
so that surviving animals will at least have an average body mass of 220 kg. 
Note that this is an extreme case which will only occur under very extreme 
conditions.
Reproduction, Birth of calves and weaning
We assume one single breeding season per year (early winter breeding 
season). Consequently, calves are born in the second half of the rainy season. 
Weaning takes places after 9 months; at the end of the dry season/beginning 
of the rainy season. Conception and weaning are stochastic and depend on 
probabilities which in turn depend on the animals’ condition score and are 
given in Table A3.4.
Mortality
Every individual animal experiences stochastic mortality on an annual basis. 
The probability to die depends on the condition score of the herd and is given in 
Table A3.4.
Table A3.4: Parameters depending on animal condition score.
Parameter Condition score
0 1 2 3 4
Mortality rate 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.035
Pregnancy rate 0.1 0.25 0.4 0.6 0.65
Weaning rate 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Price coefficient 0.3 0.5 0.65 0.8 1.0
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Vegetation dynamics
At the end of a year, the average size of the herd that was feeding on the farm 
during the year is used to calculate the changes in vegetation state for the next 
time step. Together with the total seasonal precipitation, the stocking rate can 
be used to identify the respective transition probability matrix from the matrices 
produced during the up-scaling procedure (see above). Then the transition of the 
vegetation in every cell of the vegetation grid is drawn by chance.
Calculation of costs
According to interviews with experts and farmers from the ECFSP and the 
Sandveld research station as well as data from both sources, we derived all-
inclusive costs of the farming business. The costs are split in two categories: fixed 
costs, which are calculated on the basis of farm size and variable costs that are 
related to the size of the herd. Accordingly, a minimum amount of costs are fixed 
and will always incur irrespective of the herd size (i.e. costs corresponding to a 
herd size of 25 LSU). In addition to these costs, we calculate the expenses for 
water-infrastructure maintenance and labour according to the respective on-farm 
setting. Half of the costs have to be covered at the end of rainy season and the 
other half after the second time-step at the end of the dry season. In this way, 
the participants of the role-play will know the costs when they are requested to 
make their livestock trading decisions. Costs are automatically deducted from the 
individual’s bank account.
Bank account
In the game, each player has an individual bank account. We calculate credit and 
debit interest at annual rates of 15% and 2% respectively. At the beginning of the 
game the account balance is zero.
Trading of livestock
During a one year simulation, the role players have the opportunity to interact with 
the model at two stages. The participant is requested to make a decision: what amount 
of what kind of animals to buy or sell. The categories of animals are oxen, cows, 
heifers and male and female weaners (weaned calves). Animal prices depend on the 
age and condition of an animal (see Tables A3.4 and A3.5). Selling prices are below 
purchase prices and prices in September differ from prices in April (see Table A3.5). 
Whenever animals are sold, older animals and cows that are not pregnant and have 
no calf with them are preferentially sold. Prices have been defined according to 
the 2008 prices7
 at the livestock auction in Gobabis, the capital of the Omaheke 
region. We assumed constant prices for the duration of the simulation experiment. 
Revenues from livestock sales are automatically saved on the individual’s bank 
account and expenses for livestock purchases are deducted from it.
7
 2008 livestock prices have been derived from the internet database of AGRA Namibia co-operative 
Ltd. at http://www.agra.com.na.
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Water maintenance costs
In the context of FURS, the government commonly buys larger farms (> 5000 ha) 
and splits them into smaller farm units (app. 1000 ha) which are allotted to the 
applicants. The big farms usually have a centralised water infrastructure with few 
pumps and pipes. As a result not all FURS beneficiaries have access to their own 
pump or dam and the group of beneficiaries sharing the formerly larger farm have 
to maintain the infrastructure jointly. We replicate this situation in the role-play.
In the role-play the groups of farmers who share infrastructure in real-life play 
the role-play together. The group is given one diesel and one wind pump which 
they need to maintain together. The maintenance costs for the group are randomly 
distributed. On the basis of expert interviews, they are set to, on average, N$ 
2350 (σ=785) for the diesel driven pump and N$ 750 (σ=250) for the wind driven 
pump. Farmers are not informed about the periods’ water costs before making 
their contribution and, therefore, have to make decisions under uncertainty.
The maintenance costs are automatically deducted from a group account. 
Each of the players has to decide individually, every role-play year, how much 
she wants to pay into the group account from her individual role-play account.
In the case that the money available in the fund is sufficient to cover the 
maintenance costs, no further consequences follow. If it is insufficient, the 
infrastructure breaks down. In reality, the farmers usually take their cattle to the 
neighbouring farm where they have to pay for getting access to water. We assume 
a hypothetical fee of N$ 50 per head of cattle which is based on interviews with 
farmers even though the amount strongly varies in reality. The fee is automatically 
calculated by the model and deducted from the individual bank account. If there 
is more money in the group account than needed to cover the maintenance costs, 
the amount will be saved there and can be used to cover water costs for upcoming 
role-play periods.
Table A3.5: Model parameter values.
Parameter description [name] Value Unit
Intake threshold growth [rin,lim] 0.038 –
Max. ind. bodymass [bm
max
] 470 kg
Max intake rate [rin,max] 0.05 –
Growth rate of animal [gr] 0.004 –
Factor weaner/heifer LSU 0.6 –
Factor cow/ox LSU 0.9 –
LateBSfac 0.5 –
Price for culled cow/oxen 700 N$
Price for selling heifer 3000 N$
Price for selling weaner 2000 N$
Price for selling heifer cow 4000 N$
Price for selling ox 3500 N$
Factor for dry season price 1.07 –
Factor for purchase price 1.10 –
Fixed farming costs 15 N$∙ha–1
Variable farming costs 75 N$∙LSU–1
